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Program Overview
    
Thursday, January 24, 2019
 08:15 – 09:45 Arabic Brunch, Reception & Registration
 09:45 – 09:55 Welcome
 09:55 – 10:55 Keynote Lecture I
 11:00 – 12:30 Parallel Sessions I
 12:30 – 13:45 Lunch Break
 13:45 – 15:15 Parallel Sessions II
 15:15 – 15:35 Coffee Break
 15:35 – 17:05 Parallel Sessions III
 17:05 – 20:00       Optional: Louvre Abu Dhabi Tour
Friday, January 25, 2019
 09:00 – 10:00 Keynote Lecture II
 10:00 – 10:30 Coffee Break
 10:30 – 12:00 Parallel Sessions IV
 12:00 – 13:30 Lunch Break
 13:30 – 15:00 Parallel Sessions V
 15:00 – 15:30 Coffee Break
 15:30 – 17:00 Parallel Sessions VI
 17:30 – 22:00 Conference Dinner
Saturday, January 26, 2019
 09:00 – 10:30 Parallel Sessions VII
 10:30 – 11:00 Coffee Break
 11:00 – 12:00 Keynote Lecture III
 12:00 – 13:30 Closing Lunch
 14:00 – 22:00 Optional: Desert Tour
Thursday, January 24
Keynote Lecture I. (09:55 – 10:55, Room LH007)
•	 Bertil Tungodden. ‘Fairness and Personal Responsibility’ 
Parallel Sessions I. (11:00 AM – 12:30 PM)
Session Topic: Labor Markets (Room LH007)
•	 Lata Gangadharan. ‘Social Dilemmas with Agency Risk.’
•	 Qian Weng. ‘A Field Experiment on Compensating Differentials:  
The Case of Job Flexibility.’
•	 Michal Durinik. ‘Group Identity, Promotions and Confused Subjects.’
Session Topic: Coordination (Room 004)
•	 Andrzej Baranski. ‘Efficient Coordination through Ex-post Negotiations.’
•	 Sherry Li. ‘Using Social Connections and Financial Incentives to Solve 
Coordination Failure: A Quasi-field Experiment.’
•	 Huanren Zhang. ‘Value Creation and Value Appropriation in Strategic 
Partnerships: An Experimental Study of Coopetition.’
•	 John Tisdell. ‘Notions of Equity and Equality in the Formation of Coalitions.’
Session Topic: Auctions (Room 005)
•	 Lijia Tan. ‘How Auctioneers Set Ex-ante and Ex-post Reserve Prices in 
English Auctions.’
•	 Tibor Neugebauer. ‘The Aggregation of Risk Preferences in the  
First Price Auction.’
•	 Cary Deck. ‘Emotions in First Price and Dutch Auctions.’
•	 Ajalavat Viriyavipart. ‘Deterring Bribes with Reserve Price:  
An Auction Experiment.’
Session Topic: Contests (Room 006)
•	 Aidas Masiliunas. ‘Learning in Contests with Payoff Risk and Foregone 
Payoff Information.’
•	 Lingbo Huang. ‘Arms Races, Trade and Conflict: Experimental Evidence.’
•	 Christine Harbring. ‘Competing on the Holodeck:  
The Effect of Virtual Peers and Heterogeneity in Dynamic Tournaments.’
•	 Felix Kölle. ‘Governance and Group Conflict.’
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Session Topic: Social Responsibility (Room 009)
•	 Alicja Reuben. ‘Subjects in the Lab, Activists in the Field:  
Public Goods and Punishment.’
•	 Francisco Gomez Martinez. ‘Can Collusion Promote Corporate Social 
Responsibility? Evidence from the Lab.’
•	 Yohanes Eko Riyanto. ‘Pleading with Buyers to Act Socially Responsible:  
An Experimental Investigation.’
Parallel Sessions II. (1:45 PM – 3:15 PM)
Session Topic: Beliefs (Room LH007)
•	 Sen Geng. ‘Belief Error and Non-Bayesian Social Learning:  
Experimental Evidence.’
•	 Piotr Evdokimov. ‘Higher-order Learning.’
•	 Simone Häckl. ‘Conscientious Over-placement Versus Biased  
Self-perception.’
•	 Tibor Neugebauer. ‘Heterogeneous Beliefs in Experimental Asset Markets 
Revisited.’
Session Topic: Gender (Room 004) 
•	 Aurelie Dariel. Do Lab Experiments Overestimate the Gender Gap in 
Competitiveness? The Role of Selection Bias.’
•	 Julio Mancuso. ‘Gender Differences in Self-promotion:  
Understanding the Female Modesty Constraint.’
•	 Yuval Ofek-Shanny. ‘Religion and Gender, Do They Matter?  
Experiment on Low Stakes Assessment Tests.’
•	 Agne Kajackaite. ‘Battle for the Thermostat:  
Gender and the Effect of Temperature on Cognitive Performance.’
Session Topic: Ambiguity (Room 005)
•	 Anisa Shyti. ‘The Priceless Entrepreneur?  
A Behavioral Account on Risk and Ambiguity Attitudes.’
•	 Thomas Garcia. ‘Ambiguity and Moral Wiggle Room in Donations.’
Session Topic: Social Norms (Room 006)
•	 Fabien Accominotti. ‘The Reification of Performance and the Legitimacy 
of Inequality: Theory and Experimental Evidence.’
•	 Hugh Sibly. ‘Are There Norms or Rules for the Fair Division of a Surplus?’
•	 David Kingsley. ‘Distributive Justice and Trust.’
•	 Christiane Schwieren. ‘The Effect of Experience on Social Norm 
Perception in Laboratory Experiment Participants.’
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Session Topic: Public Goods (Room 009)
•	 Jonathan Livermore. ‘Two Strikes and You’re Out! An Experiment on 
Exclusion.’
•	 Hande Erkut. ‘Endogenous Contribution to  
Local Vs. Global Public Goods with Varying Communication Networks.’
•	 Anna Rita Bennato. ‘Learning by (not) Doing.  
Behavioral Spillovers in Team Production with Coordinated Punishment.’
•	 Duk Gyoo Kim. ‘Penalty Lottery.’
Parallel Sessions III. (3:35 PM – 5:05 PM)
Session Topic: Lying (Room LH007)
•	 Marie Claire Villeval. ‘Fraud, Reputation and Competition.’
•	 Quazi Shahriar. ‘Deception: The Role of Uncertain Consequences.’
•	 Tobias Gesche. ‘Honesty in the Digital Age.’
•	 Georgia Michailidou. ‘Interdependent Lying Costs:  
Theory and Experimental Evidence.’
Session Topic: Decision Theory (Room 004)
•	 Anthony Newell. ‘Weighting for a Refined Prospect.’
•	 Despoina Alempaki. ‘Preference Reversals under Strategic Uncertainty.’
•	 Bachir Kassas. ‘Happy to Take Some Risk:  
A More Accurate Assessment of the Dependence of Risk Preferences 
on Mood.’
•	 Yohanes Eko Riyanto. ‘Halo Effect in Human-Robot Interaction:  
How Chatbot Influences Human Decision Making Under Risk.’
Session Topic: Field Experiments (Room 005)
•	 Tomomi Tanaka. ‘The Relationship between Conflicts, Economic Shocks, 
and Death with Depression, Economic Activities.’
•	 Klarizze Puzon. ‘Regional Identity and Intergenerational Resource 
Conflict: An Experiment in Guinea.’
•	 Nicholas Haas. ‘Improving Women’s Access to Justice in a Context of 
Legal Pluralism: Two Experiments on Short and Long-term Approaches in 
Somalia.’
•	 Lamis Saleh. ‘Punishment Patterns, Violence, and Distress  
among Syrian Civil War Victims in Syria: A Lab-in-the-Fi.’
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Session Topic: Discrimination (Room 006)
•	 Graeme Pearce. ‘Discrimination in British Carvery Restaurants.’
•	 Kristine Koutout. ‘Second-Order Beliefs and Gender in the Lab.’
•	 Jing Li. ‘Gender-biased Task Assignment:  
Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment.’
•	 Francisco Lagos. ‘Obesity Discrimination in Hiring:  
A Natural Field Experiment.’
Session Topic: Preferences (Room 009)
•	 Zeeshan Samad. ‘Trust and Treachery in Genetic Data Privacy.’
•	 Xiu Chen. ‘How Time Flies!’
•	 Dominik Duell. ‘Shared Social Identity and Strategic Uncertainty.’
•	 Alice Solda. ‘Strategically Delusional’
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Friday, January 25
Keynote Lecture II. (09:00 – 10:00, Room LH007) 
•	 Lise Vesterlund. ‘Breaking the Glass Ceiling:  
Insights from Experimental Economics’  
Parallel Sessions IV. (10:30 AM – 12:00 PM)
Session Topic: Gender and Competition (Room LH007)
•	 Nikos Nikiforakis. ‘Motherhood and the Willingness to Compete for Pay.’
•	 Ernesto Reuben. ‘Competitiveness and the Gender Gap among Young 
Business Professionals.’
•	 Barbora Baisa. ‘Group Membership, Team Payoff and Gender 
Competitiveness.’
•	 Hirofumi Kurokawa. ‘Ingroup Bias and Willingness to Compete.’
Session Topic: Markets (Room 004)
•	 Jacopo Magnani. ‘Limited Strategic Thinking and the Cursed Match.’
•	 Lukas Wenner. ‘Cursed Buyers in the Marketplace.’
•	 Peter Katuscak. ‘Strategy-proofness Made Simple.’
•	 Xiu Chen. ‘Concentration and Unpredictability of Forecasts in Artificial 
Investment Games: An Online Experiment.’
Session Topic: Repeated Games (Room 005)
•	 Binglin Gong. ‘Cooperation through Indirect Reciprocity:  
Impact of Higher-Order History.’
•	 Melis Kartal. ‘A New Approach to the Analysis of Cooperation Under the 
Shadow of the Future: Theory and Experiments.’
•	 Maoliang Ye. ‘Does Gradualism Build Cooperation?  
A Finitely Repeated Investment Experiment.’
•	 Andrea Isoni. ‘Trust and Mutual Benefit.’
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Session Topic: Social Preferences (Room 006)
•	 Romain Gauriot. ‘Altruism or Diminishing Marginal Utility?’
•	 Stefania Bortolotti. ‘Hope and Anger:  
An Experiment on Inequality and Disruptive Behavior.’
•	 Pierluigi Conzo. ‘Was Banfield Right?  
New Insights from a Nationwide Laboratory Experiment.’
•	 Topi Miettinen. ‘Revealed Preferences in a Sequential Prisoners’ Dilemma:  
A Horse-race between Six Utility Functions.’
Session Topic: Decisions under Risk (Room 009)
•	 Bodo Vogt. ‘Hysteresis and Prospect Theory -  
A Model and Its Experimental Evaluation for Order Effects.’
•	 Marc Willinger. ‘Consumption Smoothing and Subjective Discounting 
under Background Risk.’
•	 Sebastian Schneider. ‘Higher Order Risk:  
An Application To Savings of the Poor in Bogota.’
•	 Jonathan Chapman. ‘Loss Attitudes in the U.S. Population:  
Evidence from Dynamically Optimized Sequential Experimentation.’
Session Topic: Bounded Rationality (Room 001A)
•	 Daniela Di Cagno. ‘Learning To Avoid Sub-optimality:  
Experimental Evidence of Intermediate Advice.’
•	 Aljaz Ule. ‘Commitment Aversion Revisited.’
•	 Ismael Rafai. ‘Revealed Preferences under Stochastic Attention.  
Characterization, Statistical Test and Experimental Evidence.’
•	 Fabien Perez. ‘Self-selection into Strategic Environments.’
Session Topic: Cooperation (Room 001C)
•	 Yu Gao. ‘Unequal Past, Shared Future-reaching Agreement with  
Responsibilities Passed by Generations.’
•	 Jan Frederik Graff. ‘Reviewing and Predicting Cooperation in Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Games: A Meta-Study.’
•	 Levent Neyse. ‘Social Comparisons in the Public Goods Game.’
•	 Ning Liu. ‘Visions Fly and Actions Follow:  
Estimation of Successors’ Actions Enhances Intergenerational Altruism.’
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Parallel Sessions V. (1:30 PM – 3:00 PM)
Session Topic: Political Economy (Room LH007)
•	 Rebecca Morton. ‘Social Groups, Information Sharing, and the 
Effectiveness of Public Protests.’
•	 Lionel Page. ‘Too Big To Prevail:  
Coalition Formations in the Presence of a Superpower.’
•	 Aaron Kamm. ‘Policy Capture by Special Interests in Democracies:  
The Role of Revolving Doors and Post-office Employees.’
Session Topic: Nudges (Room 004)
•	 Henning Hermes. ‘Motivating Low-Achievers – Relative Performance 
Feedback in School.’
•	 Haoran He. ‘Goal Setting, Effort Provision and Performance:  
A Field Experiment in College Physical Training Courses.’
•	 Yu Gao. ‘It’s So Hot in Here: Information Avoidance, Moral Wiggle Room,  
and High Air Conditioning Usage.’
•	 Shemal Doshi. ‘Fine as a Nudge: Experimental Evidence.’
Session Topic: Morals (Room 005)
•	 Xiangdong Qin. ‘Two-Stage Moral Behaviors:  
Some Evidence from Lab Experiment.’
•	 Björn Bartling. ‘Do Markets Undermine Morals?.’
•	 Wladislaw Mill. ‘The Normative Perception of Power Abuse.’
•	 Vera te Velde. ‘Is Moral Thinking Marginal Thinking?.’
Session Topic: Peer Punishment (Room 006)
•	 David Kingsley. ‘Peer Punishment, Income Inequality and Incomplete Information.’
•	 Agnalys Michaud. ‘Effectiveness of Peer Punishment under Negative Framing.’
•	 Andreas Nicklisch. ‘War Experience, Religiosity, and Punishment Schemes: 
Field Evidence from Syria.’
Session Topic: Beliefs (Room 009)
•	 Matej Lorko. ‘Historical Information and Project Duration Estimates.’
•	 Ritwik Banerjee. ‘Self-confidence Spillovers and Motivated Beliefs.’
•	 Zeeshan Samad. ‘Self-deception.’
•	 Jan Zilinsky. ‘Learning about Income Inequality Changes Views But Does 
Not Mobilize Voters.’
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Session Topic: Industrial Organization (Room 001A)
•	 Silvester Van Koten. ‘Self-regulation and Meta-regulation –  
Regulating the Members or the SRO? A Theoretical and Experimental.’
•	 Siqi Pan. ‘Do Exploding Offers Really Explode?  
The Role of Commitment in Search Deterrence.’
•	 Jason Shachat. ‘Group Identity and Implicit Collusion in Cournot 
Competition: Theory and Experiments.’
•	 Xiaoyuan Wang. ‘The Effect of Information Disclosure on an Experimental 
Hold-up Game.’
Parallel Sessions VI. (3:30 PM – 5:00 PM)
Session Topic: Industrial Organization (Room LH007)
•	 Karim Sadrieh. ‘Short-term versus Long-term Contracting:  
Empirical Assessment of the Ratchet Effect in Supply Chain.’
•	 Francisco Gomez Martinez. ‘Partial Cartels and Mergers with 
Heterogeneous Firms: Experimental Evidence.’
•	 Jana Peliova. ‘Experimenting with Price Gouging and Newsvendor 
Problem.’
Session Topic: Lying (Room 004)
•	 Nick Feltovich. ‘What Kind of Communication Is Best?  
Cheap Talk with Two Senders and One Receiver.’
•	 Manuel Munoz. ‘Web of Lies:  
Preventing the Spread of False Information in Networks through 
Verification.’
•	 Frederic Schneider. ‘The Persistent Power of Promises.’
•	 Francesca Marazzi. ‘Telling the Other What One Knows?  
Strategic Lying in a Modified Acquiring-a-Company Experiment with.’
Session Topic: Asset Markets (Room 005)
•	 Lijia Wei. ‘Supply Fluctuations and Bubbles of Real Assets:  
A Experimental Study.’
•	 Nilanjan Roy. ‘Achieving Pareto Optimality even though Prices Are “Wrong”.’
•	 Adriana Breaban. ‘Animal Spirits, Greater Fools, or Safety First:  
How Do Optimism, Cognitive Reflection, and Risk Aversion.’
•	 Christina Rott. ‘Preference for Housing Services and the Magnitude of 
Housing Bubbles: Evidence from a Macro-Experiment’
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Session Topic: Games (Room 006)
•	 John Wooders. ‘Nash at Wimbledon:  
Evidence from Half A Million Serves.’
•	 James Fisher. ‘Interacting Cascades Experiment:  
Informational Spillovers.’
•	 Javier Perote. ‘Endogenous vs. Exogenous Leadership in Teamwork:  
An Experimental Study.’
•	 Jonas Fooken. ‘Gift Exchange When Gifts Are Taxed.’
Session Topic: Communication (Room 009)
•	 Pablo Hernandez-Lagos.  
‘Cooperative Initiative through Pre-Play Communication in One-Shot 
Games.’
•	 Yang Yang. ‘On Language and Meaning:  
A Randomized Experiment.’
•	 Marianne Stephanides. ‘Helping and Communication.’
•	 Lu Dong. ‘Talking Behind Your Back:  
Asymmetric Communication in a Three-person Dilemma.’
Session Topic: Field Experiments (Room 001A)
•	 Mirco Tonin. ‘Pay-What-You-Want To Support Independent Information -  
A Field Experiment on Motivation.’
•	 Maria Recalde. ‘Leadership and Risk-taking:  
A Field Experiment on the Mechanisms Underlying Social Influence.’
•	 Fernanda Leite Lopez de Leon. ‘Prejudice in the Age of Brexit:  
A Field-Experiment.’
•	 John Gibson. ‘Quality, Quantity, and Price:  
Experimental Evidence on Taxing Soft Drinks.’
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Saturday, January 26
Parallel Sessions VII. (9:00 AM – 10:30 AM)
Session Topic: Bargaining (Room LH007)
•	 Olivier Bochet. 'Experiments on Multidimensional Bargaining.’
•	 Ben Greiner. 'The Economics of Colors: A Null Result.'
•	 Bassim Allaheebb. 'The Effect of Effort in the Ultimatum Game:  
A Cross-cultural Analysis.'
•	 Lina Lozano. 'The Impact of the Menstrual Cycle on Bargaining Behavior.'
Session Topic: Relative Performance (Room 004)
•	 Gwen-Jiro Clochard. 'Improved Information or Taste for Ranking?  
Experimental Evidence of the Role of Relative Performance.'
•	 Juliana Silva Goncalves. 'Long-lasting Effects of Relative Age at School.'
•	 Mingye Ma. 'Using Relative Marking Scheme To Motivate Group Effort 
Provision: Field Evidence from College Students.'
•	 Bettina Rockenbach. 'Social Context Engineering in Children.'
Session Topic: Public Policy (Room 005)
•	 Romain Ferrali. 'Partners in Crime? Corruption as a Criminal Network.'
•	 Chagai Weiss. 'Can Brief Intergroup Contact Affect Attitudes?  
A Natural Experiment in Israeli Medical Clinics’.
•	 Matteo Ploner. 'When the State Doesn't Play Dice:  
An Experimental Analysis of Cunning Fiscal Policies and Tax Compliance.'
Session Topic: Principal Agent Problems (Room 006)
•	 Michal Durinik. 'Post Promotion Effort and Group Identity.'
•	 Mirco Tonin. 'Paying for What Kind of Performance?  
Performance Pay and Multitasking in Mission-oriented Jobs.'
•	 Andrej Angelovski. 'Bidding for Better Jobs:  
An Experimental Comparison of Intra- vs. Inter-firm Hiring.'
•	 Sibilla Di Guida. 'Testing the Myth of Fee-For-Service and Overprovision 
in Health Care.'
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Session Topic: Methodology (Room 009)
•	 Stephanie Thomas. 'Using Virtual Environments To Study Health Related 
Decisions: Early Results Using A New Effort Task.'
•	 Robert Schmidt. 'Identifying the Distribution of Focal Points in 
Coordination Games on the Individual Level.'
•	 Theodore Turocy. 'A Demonstration and Comparison of Estimation 
Methods for Quantal Response Equilibria in Games.'
•	 Xu Yan. 'Top-Flop Betting:  
An Incentive Mechanism To Elicit Unverifiable Truths.'
Session Topic: Bounded Rationality (Room 001A)
•	 Hanh Tong. 'Individual Heterogeneity in Traveler's Dilemma.'
•	 Ada Kovaliukaite. 'The Predictive Success of Theories of  
Strategic Thinking: A Non-parametric Evaluation.'
•	 Daniel Schunk. 'An Experimental Beauty-Contest Game with  
Children and Adults.'
•	 Konrad Grabiszewski. 'Tree Construction and Backward Induction:  
A Mobile Experiment.
Keynote Lecture lll. (11:00 – 12:00, Room LH007)
•	 Tim Cason. ‘Twenty Years of Price Dispersion and Cycles in  
Laboratory Markets’
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Thursday, January 24
Parallel Sessions I. (11:00 AM – 12:30 PM)
Session Topic: Labor Markets (Room LH007)
•	 Lata Gangadharan. ‘Social Dilemmas with Agency Risk.’
Authors: Tim Cason, Lana Friesen and Lata Gangadharan
Abstract: Many social dilemmas involve decisions made by firms. This 
experimental study modifies the standard gift exchange environment 
employed to represent firms’ principal-agent problem to include a social 
dilemma and stochastic agent performance. Agents’ unobservable effort 
choices affect the likelihood of a bad outcome occurring, which harms both 
the agent’s principal but also others. In our baseline treatment, we omit the 
agency problem, and principals make their “firm’s” effort decision directly. 
This provides a baseline measure of principals’ preferences regarding 
the social dilemma. In the second treatment, principals can only offer an 
unconditional wage contract to their agent, although a non-contractual (ex-
post) bonus can be paid. In our third treatment, wages can be conditioned 
on the stochastic outcome, and a non-contractual bonus is still feasible. We 
find that principals use conditional wage contracts to incentivize agents 
to make their desired effort choice, while unconditional contracts lead 
to significantly lower effort levels. In contrast to theoretical predictions 
however, principals use a combination of a conditional wage and the non-
contractual (ex-post) bonus to solve the agency problem. Therefore, when 
conditional wage contracts are possible, agency risk does not exacerbate 
the social dilemma problem. On the other hand, fixed wage contracts, even 
with (non-contractual) bonuses, lead to worse outcomes.
•	 Qian Weng. ‘A Field Experiment on Compensating Differentials:  
The Case of Job Flexibility.’
Authors: Haoran He, David Neumark, Qian Weng
Abstract: We explore evidence on compensating differentials and the 
flexibility of jobs offered by employers, using data from a field experiment 
on a Chinese job board. In the experiment, we generate random variation 
across job seekers in invitations to apply for jobs that differ in terms of 
job flexibility ‘ job flexibility conditions that vary with respect to both 
when one works (time flexibility) and where one works (place flexibility). 
We find strong experimental evidence that workers value job flexibility ‘ 
and especially flexibility regarding place of work. Across the experimental 
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variation in invitations to apply for jobs that our subjects receive, they are 
much more likely to apply for flexible jobs, conditional on the salary offered. 
Moreover, when we administer a questionnaire to job seekers who have 
applied for our experimental jobs, there is strong evidence they are willing 
to take lower pay in return for more flexible jobs ‘ in particular jobs with 
flexibility regarding work location. Finally, non-experimental data from the 
job board we utilize does not find evidence that workers value job flexibility. 
The contrast with the experimental evidence indicates that experimental 
data can be valuable in providing evidence on workers’ willing to pay for 
positive job amenities or to avoid negative job amenities.   
•	 Michal Durinik. ‘Group Identity, Promotions and Confused Subjects.’
Authors: Michal Durinik, Maros Servatka, Lyla Zhang
Abstract: Are decision makers more likely to promote internal candidates 
than external ones? And do they favor internal candidates even if they are 
less productive? We employ a novel setup, where using a Multiple Price 
List decision makers engage in other-other allocations that also impacts 
their own earnings. We find that decision makers maximize their own 
earnings first and only when indifferent in this respect they consider group 
identity. We frame the experiment in a neutral language of “selections” 
and “Participants”. We find that a significant proportion of decision 
makers display multiple switching behavior in the multiple price list. We, 
therefore, introduce a labor market framed treatment with “promotions” 
and “workers” and find similar behavior patterns with lower incidence of 
multiple switching behavior. This suggests that loaded language helps 
subject comprehension and does not need to be associated with loss of 
experimental control.  
Session Topic: Coordination (Room 004)
•	 Andrzej Baranski. ‘Efficient Coordination through ex post Negotiations.’
Abstract: Synergies in production are ubiquitous in shared production 
processes such as those involving individuals within a team, departments 
within a firm, or industries within a country. Using a weakest-link game with 
ex post bargaining to redistribute the joint surplus we study a situation in 
which no central manager (or principal) can induce coordination through 
contracts, but instead team members themselves decide how to compensate 
each other. We show that standard bargaining theory (stationary equilibria) 
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predictions do not provide a rationale for selecting efficient outcomes 
among the multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. Nevertheless, we propose 
history-dependent bargaining strategies based on members’ contributions 
which refine the set of equilibria selecting only the most and least efficient 
outcomes. An experiment reveals that ex post bargaining leads to enhanced 
efficiency compared to the benchmark weakest-link game. This is a 
particularly strong result since we implement a random subject rematching 
protocol. When efforts are not publicly known (due to monitoring costs 
for example) average effort falls close to that observed without bargaining 
and a similar result holds when the distribution of the surplus is private 
information.
•	 Sherry Li. ‘Using Social Connections and Financial Incentives to Solve 
Coordination Failure: A Quasi-Field Experiment.’
Authors: Farzana Afridi, Amrita Dhillon, Sherry Xin Li, Swati Sharma
Abstract: Production processes are often organized in teams, yet there 
is limited evidence on whether and how social connections and financial 
incentives affect productivity in tasks that require coordination among 
workers. We simulate assembly line production in a lab-in-the-field 
experiment in which workers exert real effort in a minimum-effort game 
in teams whose members are either socially connected or unconnected 
and are paid according to the group output. We find that group output 
increases by 18% and coordination improves by 30-39% when workers are 
socially connected with their co-workers. Connected groups continue to 
coordinate better when we introduce a lump sum bonus, suggesting that 
financial and social incentives can be complementary in this setting. Our 
results are driven by men whose average productivity is significantly lower 
than that of women. These findings can be plausibly explained by trust 
between co-workers in socially connected teams.
•	 Huanren Zhang. ‘Value creation and value appropriation in strategic 
partnerships: An experimental study of coopetition.’
Abstract: Many inter-organizational and intra-organizational activities 
involve both cooperation and competition: economic agents cooperate 
to use their complementary resources to create value but at the same 
time compete for the created value. In this paper, we design a 2-player 
coopetition game to study this tension between value creation and value 
appropriation both theoretically and experimentally. Equilibrium analysis 
shows that this game has multiple equilibria: one with zero co-created value 
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and the other with positive co-created value. Consistent with the analysis, 
when there is competition for existing values, players invest more in value 
appropriation and less in value creation. We find that individuals are 
conditional cooperators: players adjust their investment in value creation in 
the direction of matching their opponents’ investment level in the previous 
round. Previous experience has a significant influence on cooperation and 
competition level even the environment has changed.
•	 John Tisdell. ‘Notions of equity and equality in the formation of 
coalitions.’
Abstract: The study has two objectives (1) to better understand strategic 
coalition formation in cooperative games and (2) evaluate how well 
traditional cooperative game solutions compare to experimental results. 
In terms of understanding strategic coalition formation in cooperative 
games we found (a) the formation of grand coalitions is rare even when it 
is beneficial to form such coalitions, and (b) whether an equality outcome 
existed or not, and whether it was within the core or not has a substantial 
impact on the distribution of final payoffs. In terms of the relative merits of 
game theory modelling and economic experiments we found them to be 
largely consistent. The contribution of the study is in demonstrating the 
importance notions of equity and equality in explaining strategic behaviour 
in the formation of coalitions.
Session Topic: Auctions (Room 005)
•	 Lijia Tan. ‘How Auctioneers Set Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Reserve Prices in 
English Auctions.’
Authors: LijiaTan, Jason Shachat
Abstract: We provide a direct experimental comparison of auctioneer 
behaviour in the English auctions with reserve price (ex-ante reserve price) 
and the English auctions with bargaining (ex-post reserve price). These 
two mechanisms indirectly implementing Mayerson’s optimal mechanisms 
have two counterintuitive predictions: optimal ex-ante reserve prices are 
independent of the number of bidders and optimal ex-post reserve prices 
are independent of the auction price. We consider two behavioral models, 
anticipated regret model (Davis et al., 2011) and subjective conditional 
probability model which is a general form of subjective posterior 
probability model (Shachat and Tan, 2015), to formulate the hypotheses 
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as well as predict the experimental outcome respectively. We find that a 
s-shaped distorted conditional probability judgement provides a consistent 
explanation of why buyers deviate the two counterintuitive predictions 
while anticipated regrets only can explain the first half. Moreover, we do 
not find a significant difference between the average buyers’ profit in 
two mechanisms under the environment of uniform cost distribution. And 
therefore we design a subsequent experiment with a high-cost environment 
where the anticipated regret model predicts buyers yield less profit in ex-
ante reserve price auctions. Experimental results show that there is rather 
no significant difference between two mechanisms in term of the buyers’ 
profit, being consistent with our out-of-sample predictions based on 
s-shaped distorted conditional probability judgement.
•	 Tibor Neugebauer. ‘The Aggregation of Risk Preferences in the First 
Price Auction.’
Authors: Tibor Neugebauer, Gabriel Kaiser
Abstract: This paper presents and evaluates models that aggregate the 
risk aversion coefficient elicited from four independent first-price sealed-
bid auctions of different market size without information feedback but 
common value. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we confirm 
the overbidding effect, curse of winning, which is decreasing in market size. 
Furthermore, we observe that the bid-value ratio converge to one relative 
to the RNNE with increasing market size, using a novel sample. Secondly, 
we provide an evaluation of equilibrium models that differ in aggregation 
methods of the four market sizes per individual. We aim to find a model 
that does not fail to model the curse of winning, such as the RNNE, but 
simultaneously considers the decrease of the overbidding effect with 
increasing market size. The conducted horse race reveals the Decreasing 
overbidding model as superior replicating the overbidding phenomena.
•	 Cary Deck. ‘Emotions in First Price and Dutch Auctions.’
Authors: Adriana Breaban, Cary Deck, Erik Johnson
Abstract: We analyze the emotional reactions of subjects competing in 
first price and Dutch auctions.  The observed facial expressions suggest 
that the theoretically isomorphic auction formats elicit different emotional 
reactions.  In particular, bidders in Dutch auctions who have high values 
become more aroused and positive as the auction progresses.  However, 
overall subjects in both formats are not happy during the experiments.   
2019 Asia-Pacific Meeting of the Economic Science Association 2524 2019 Asia-Pacific Meeting of the Economic Science Association
•	 Ajalavat Viriyavipart. ‘Deterring bribes with reserve price:  
an auction experiment.’
Authors: Pacharasut Sujarittanonta and Ajalavat Viriyavipart
Abstract: This paper experimentally investigates bribing behaviors in the 
first-price sealed-bid auctions with private and independent values. Before 
the auction, one bidder may offer the other bidder for a commitment not to 
participate in the auction. We consider two treatments: one with no reserve 
price and one with the optimal reserve price. Even though theory predicts 
no bribe offered in any of the treatments, we observe prevalent bribing and 
the bribes were frequently accepted in both treatments. The responders 
demand a larger proportion of benefit in the treatment with reserve price, 
while the proposers offer proportionally the same bribe amounts in the two 
treatments. As a result, the average bribe amount and rate of successful 
bribes are significantly lower in the treatment with reserve price. Although 
imposing the reserve price reduces efficiency, its optimality and bribe 
deterrence shift surplus from the bidders to the seller.
Session Topic: Contests (Room 006)
•	 Aidas Masiliunas. ‘Learning in contests with payoff risk and foregone 
payoff information.’
Abstract: It is not well understood why game theory explains behavior in 
some games, but not in others. Tullock contest is an example of a game 
in which choices significantly deviate from Nash equilibrium predictions, 
and it is not clear why. We test a hypothesis that deviations are caused 
by slow convergence of a boundedly-rational learning process. We 
identify two elements of the game that slow down payoff-based learning, 
and eliminate them in an experiment. First, the distribution of  payoffs 
generated by each action depends on opponent’s action that varies over 
time. We eliminate this source of payoff variability by providing foregone 
payoff information, allowing all actions to be evaluated against the same 
sequence of opponent’s actions. The second element is payoff risk, which 
slows down learning by reducing the correlation between realized and 
expected payoffs. We manipulate payoff risk using a 2x2 design: payoffs 
from contest investments are either risky (as in standard contests) or safe 
(as in proportional contests), and payoffs from the part of endowment not 
invested in the contest can also be either safe (as in standard contests) 
or risky. We find that Nash equilibrium rates go up to 100% when payoff 
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risk is not present and foregone payoff information is available, but are 
at most 20% in all other cases. This result can be explained by payoff-
based learning but not by other theories that might interact with payoff 
risk (non-monetary utility of winning, risk-seeking preferences, spitefulness, 
probability weighting, QRE). We propose a hybrid learning model that 
combines reinforcement and belief learning with preferences, and show 
that it fits data well, mostly because of reinforcement learning.
•	 Lingbo Huang. ‘Arms races, trade and conflict: Experimental evidence.’
Authors: Klaus Abbink; Lu Dong
Abstract: We study escalation and aggression in an experimental first-
strike game. Two players play multiple rounds of a money-earning task. In 
each round, each player can spend money to accumulate weapons. The 
player with more weapons can strike against the other player, which almost 
totally eliminates the victim’s earnings potential, and the victim loses the 
capacity to strike. In four treatments, we find that deterrence works better if 
it cannot be observed, that a balance of power is effective in keeping peace, 
and that mutually beneficial trade decreases the risk of confrontation, but 
not necessarily the likelihood of costly arms races. 
•	 Christine Harbring. ‘Competing on the Holodeck:  
The effect of virtual peers and heterogeneity in dynamic tournaments.’
Authors: Frederik Graf, Christian Grund and Christine Harbring
Abstract: We propose a new approach to examining heterogeneity 
in dynamic tournaments. We simulate a realistic working situation in a 
highly immersive environment. Implementing a tournament in virtual 
reality (VR) allows us to ceteris paribus control for the performance of the 
virtual peer (humanoid avatar), and thus to get an understanding of the 
reaction of the subject to the avatar in a really dynamic setting, as the 
subject is constantly able to observe the avatar’s performance. Moreover, 
we are able to mitigate the reflection problem, which usually undermines 
research on dynamic interaction. Based on a first experimental phase, we 
are able to match our subjects with an avatar yielding a specific output. 
We observe that the subjects’ performance is highest in a homogeneous 
tournament, i.e., when they compete against an avatar achieving the same 
output as they did in the preceding phase. Interestingly, these results are 
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particularly driven by peer effects rather than by tournament incentives. 
We extensively track the behavior of subjects and the particular situation 
and, e.g., examine the role of intermediate score differences and the degree 
of the subjects’ movements. 
•	 Felix Kölle. ‘Governance and Group Conflict.’
Abstract: Many situations in the social and economic life are characterized 
by rivalry and conflict between two or more competing groups. Warfare, 
socio-political conflicts, political elections, lobbying, R&D competitions, 
and promotion tournaments, are all examples of inter-group conflicts in 
which groups spend scarce and costly resources to gain an advantage over 
other groups. The groups that compete in such contests are typically not 
created equal. In this paper, we report on an experiment that investigates 
the impact of institutions on the development of conflict. The role of 
institutions have been studied extensively in the area of cooperation in 
social dilemma situations, and are at the heart of the long lasting debate 
on why there are pronounced cross-country differences in economic 
growth, development, inequality, and poverty. Yet, to what extent different 
institutions affect the development of group conflict is not yet well 
understood, and clean empirical evidence on this question is almost absent. 
This project aims at filling this gap by comparing conflict behavior between 
prominent types of institutions affecting how decisions are determined 
within groups: Autonomy (each group member individually decides on his/
her conflict engagement), democracy (a group’s conflict engagement is 
determined democratically by voting), and dictatorship (the group’s conflict 
engagement is determined by a single group member, the dictator). As a 
workhorse for studying group conflict, we use an experimental version of 
Tullock’s contest game. In line with our predictions, we find that democracy 
leads to higher conflict expenditures compared to the autonomy case, but 
that, in contrast to our predictions, dictatorship does not further increase 
conflict. When letting subjects endogenously adopt an institution, however, 
we find the dictatorship to be the least popular, as it comes with the highest 
degree of inequality.
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Session Topic: Social Responsibility (Room 009)
•	 Alicja Reuben. ‘Subjects in the Lab, Activists in the Field:  
Public Goods and Punishment.’
Authors: Chetan Dave, Sjur Hamre, Curtis Kephart
Abstract: We compare standard (laboratory) and non-standard (field) 
subject pool behavior in an extensive form public goods game with random 
punishment. Our experimental investigation is motivated by real-world 
`Activists’ in assisting local public goods provision by Firms; an activity 
known as corporate social responsibility (Benabou and Tirole (2010), Baron 
(2001)). We find that relative to lab subjects, real-world activists in Mumbai, 
India are more willing to settle at the Nash equilibrium of the game (which 
entails increased provision of public goods) and are more willing to punish 
non-cooperative behavior on the part of firms even if such punishment 
hurts their own payoffs.
•	 Francisco Gomez Martinez. ‘Can Collusion Promote Corporate Social 
Responsibility? Evidence from the Lab.’
Authors: Francisco Gomez Martinez, Sander Onderstal,  Maarten Pieter 
Schinkel
Abstract: Established findings that competition erodes socially responsible 
behavior on markets suggest that collusion between firms may promote 
it. Theoretically, collusion among profit-maximizing firms may increase 
sustainable production, in particular because coordination allows them 
to differentiate their products, but at the expense of consumers paying 
higher prices. However, if firms have an intrinsic motivation for corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), allowing them to collude can benefit consumers 
if firms coordinate on selling the same greener quality. We test collusion 
with CSR preferences in three laboratory experiments. Participants playing 
the role of firms can choose between offering a `fair’ and an `unfair’ good 
to a consumer after which they post a price. Subsequently, the consumer 
can choose between the two offers. We vary whether or not the firms can 
coordinate on the type of good they sell. We observe that participants’ 
CSR preferences are positively correlated with them offering the fair good 
in the role of firm. Market interaction erodes CSR preferences in both 
treatments. The opportunity to coordinate on product quality separates 
the product types offered to and traded on the market into two extremes: 
only fair and only unfair. The fraction of fair goods on average is the same 
across treatments. The increase in product homogeneity in each extreme 
2019 Asia-Pacific Meeting of the Economic Science Association 2928 2019 Asia-Pacific Meeting of the Economic Science Association
type does soften cartel overcharges: prices in the cartel treatment can even 
decrease. We identify characteristics that shift the mass of product quality 
more to fair production. These findings suggest that allowing collusion for 
the purpose of promoting sustainable production may stimulate a green 
top-line product variety, but it diminishes sustainability of the remainder of 
the product spectrum in an off-setting way.
•	 Yohanes Eko Riyanto. ‘Pleading with Buyers to Act Socially Responsible:  
An Experimental Investigation.’
Authors: Yohanes E. Riyanto, Yan Wang, and Yew Kwang Ng
Abstract: We experimentally investigate the role of third parties’ effort 
to make a plea to buyers to choose a fair (socially responsible) product 
that does not exert any negative externalities on third parties in a posted-
offer market environment. In our setup, sellers face a choice of producing 
a fair or an unfair product. We vary sellers’ relative costs of producing a 
fair product vis-a-vis an unfair product. We investigate what influences the 
increase in these relative costs have on sellers’ incentives to produce a fair 
product and buyers to purchase a fair product instead of an unfair product, 
and on the effectiveness of third parties’ plea. We show that such pleading 
can promote socially responsible behavior through its effects on changing 
both sellers’ and buyers’ attitude towards third parties’ welfare.
Parallel Sessions II. (1:45 PM – 3:15 PM)
Session Topic: Beliefs (Room LH007)
•	 Sen Geng. ‘Belief Error and Non-Bayesian Social Learning:  
Experimental Evidence.’
Authors: Bogaçhan Çelen, Sen Geng, and Huihui Li
Abstract: This paper experimentally studies whether individuals hold 
a first-order belief that others apply Bayes’ rule to incorporate private 
information into their beliefs, which is a fundamental assumption in many 
Bayesian and non-Bayesian social learning models. We design a novel 
experimental setting in which the first-order belief assumption implies that 
social information is equivalent to private information. Our main finding 
is that participants’ reported reservation prices of social information 
are significantly lower than those of private information, which provides 
evidence that casts doubt on the first-order belief assumption. We also build 
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a novel belief error model in which participants form a random posterior 
belief with a Bayesian posterior belief kernel to explain the experimental 
findings. The structural estimation of the model suggests that participants’ 
sophisticated consideration of others’ belief error and their exaggeration of 
the error both contribute to the difference in reservation prices.
•	 Piotr Evdokimov. ‘Higher-order Learning.’
Authors: Piotr Evdokimov and Umberto Garfagnini
Abstracts: We study experimentally how subjects learn about the beliefs of 
others and identify several empirical facts. First, higher-order beliefs account 
for how lower-order beliefs are formed and in particular are updated more 
slowly when information about lower-order beliefs is uncertain. Second, 
higher-order beliefs do not correctly take into account the heterogeneity in 
how lower-order beliefs are formed and, as a result, become less accurate as 
more information about lower-order beliefs is received. Third, a significant 
fraction of higher-order beliefs mistakingly treats private information as 
public. We discuss the implications of our results for models of common 
learning, information projection, and macroeconomic dynamics. 
•	 Simone Häckl. ‘Conscientious over-placement versus biased  
self-perception.’
Abstract: In a real-effort, laboratory experiment, we challenge the 
assumption that over-placement is driven by a biased self-perception, 
i.e., overconfidence, and provide evidence for conscious overstatement 
of ability. We find that participants, who over-place themselves prior to 
working on the task, work harder in the subsequent real-effort task, even 
if this is costly to them. This indicates not only awareness of the over-
placement, but also a willingness to pay to live up to their self-assessment. 
Furthermore, we find that women adapt their self-assessment in the 
presence of public observability and feedback, while we do not find such 
effects for men.
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•	 Tibor Neugebauer. ‘Heterogeneous beliefs in experimental asset markets 
revisited.’
Authors: Michael Mitzkewitz and Tibor Neugebauer
Abstract: We investigate the question if we can recover original trader’s 
beliefs in experimental asset taking recourse in econometrics and 
experimental design. We conduct new experimental sessions to investigate 
how much of subjects’ individual expectations is home-made and how 
much is affected by the market environment. Our results suggest reliable 
recovery of median expectations when subjects have the same information. 
Treatment comparison suggests no effect on beliefs of subjects’ action 
space, whether they trade or observe the market. We suggest several 
models to recover the individual expectations to conclude that we are 
unable to recover the individual expectations. We draw that conclusion after 
observing that the median expectation fits the individual expectation as 
well or better than the other models. Hence, we reconfirm the observation 
that beliefs in asset markets are heterogeneous. 
Session Topic: Gender (Room 004) 
•	 Aurelie Dariel. Do lab experiments overestimate the gender gap in 
competitiveness? The role of selection bias.’
Authors: Aurelie Dariel, Nikos Nikiforakis & Jan Stoop
Abstract: Evidence from laboratory experiments suggests there is a robust 
difference in the willingness to compete between men and women. The 
extent to which this gender gap in competitiveness is affected by selection 
bias, however, is unknown. We measured the willingness of 1,145 students 
to compete in a classroom experiment thus avoiding selection effects. 
Separately, we invited all of them to participate in a laboratory experiment 
using common recruitment procedures. To evaluate the impact of selection 
bias on the estimated gender gap, we compare the choices of students 
who eventually participated in a laboratory experiment to those who did 
not. Although a significant gender gap is found for participant and non-
participant samples, we find that the estimated gender gap is approximately 
twice as large in the laboratory sample as in the original population. 
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•	 Julio Mancuso. ‘Gender differences in Self-Promotion: 
Understanding the female modesty constraint.’
Abstract: Individuals are often required to self-promote for professional 
recognition and career success. In this paper, we investigate the existence 
and the determinants of gender differences in self-promotion. Using a novel 
experiment, we show that women are significantly less likely to self-promote 
relative to men. We establish that the difference in behavior across gender 
is determined by women’s social image concerns of being perceived as 
immodest and not because of an inherent preference for modesty.  We find 
that the provision of a justification to self-promote leads to the elimination 
of the gender gap. 
•	 Yuval Ofek-Shanny. ‘Religion and Gender, Do they Matter?  
Experiment on Low Stakes Assessment Tests.’
Abstract: Standardized assessment tests are increasingly used as an 
important policy and research tool. We examine how eighth graders 
perform, based upon gender and religion, on a real-life high-stakes test 
in comparison to a low-stakes test. Both tests were in the Israeli national 
math assessment test design. Overall, Jews have a signicantly smaller (15.4 
points) grade difference between the high-stakes and the low-stakes test 
than Arabs (23.7). This suggest that 60% of the Jewish-Arab performance 
gap in national assessment tests can be attributed to effort differences in 
the test itself rather than in student ability.  Furthermore, we find that Muslim 
girls achieve higher grades in low-stakes assessment tests than similar 
ability Muslim boys. However, we find that religious Jewish girls perform 
worse than similar ability religious Jewish boys. We find no difference in 
gender with secular Jewish and Christian Arab students. This study shows 
the need for a careful examination and analysis of performance gaps across 
population groups. On a broader scale, we show that educational reforms 
and educational and economic policy must use caution when assessing the 
policy results according to low-stakes assessment tests such as the PISA, 
TIMSS, etc.
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•	 Agne Kajackaite. ‘Battle for the Thermostat:  
Gender and the Effect of Temperature on Cognitive Performance.’
Authors: Tom Chang & Agne Kajackaite
Abstract: This paper studies the effect of temperature on cognitive 
performance by men and women in a large controlled lab experiment 
(N=543). We find that temperature has significant and heterogeneous 
effects across men and women. For women, higher temperatures are 
associated with better performance on both a math and verbal task while 
the reverse is observed for men.  In contrast, temperature had no impact 
on a measure of cognitive reflection for both genders. The positive change 
in female performance in response to higher temperature is significantly 
larger and more precisely estimated than the corresponding opposite 
effect on male performance. This finding suggests that in gender balanced 
offices one may be able to increase productivity by setting the thermostat 
higher than current standards.
Session Topic: Ambiguity (Room 005)
•	 Anisa Shyti. ‘The Priceless Entrepreneur?  
A Behavioral Account on Risk and Ambiguity Attitudes.’
Authors: Amir Sasson, Corina Paraschiv
Abstract: Prior research suggests that entrepreneurs are rewarded 
for bearing ambiguity. Evidence, however, reports no difference in risk/
ambiguity attitudes between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. We 
reconcile this inconsistency through two prospect theory experiments 
and a population study of entrepreneurs. Experimental results show that 
entrepreneurs are more ambiguity tolerant than non-entrepreneurs, and 
demand higher wage equivalents to abandon an entrepreneurial project. 
In the population study of equilibrium wages of entrepreneurs who 
return to employment, we both corroborate the experimental findings 
and disentangle skill premia, the price of strategic human capital, from 
ambiguity premia, the price of entrepreneur’s freedom. Findings support 
unique and substantial ambiguity premia. We argue that entrepreneur’s 
ambiguity tolerance may influence strategic decision making and 
drive impactful exploratory strategies in uncharted terrains, within and 
outside the firm.
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•	 Thomas Garcia. ‘Ambiguity and moral wiggle room in donations.’
Authors: Sébastien Massoni and Marie Claire Villeval
Abstract: Individuals are generally less generous in situations where the 
relationship between their actions and resulting outcomes is vague. Risk is 
a simple way of distorting the relationship between actions and outcomes. 
Our experiment indicates that donations with a risky cost are affected by 
self-excusing behaviors in the sense that individuals use the risk to decrease 
their donations. However, donations with risky benefits are not affected by 
such behavior. Ambiguity describes real-life situations better than risk as 
it reflects the lack of information that individuals face in their everyday 
lives. Under ambiguity, the relationship between their actions and resulting 
outcomes is also more equivocal than under risk as the uncertainty is 
not quantified anymore. However, our experiment indicates that excuse-
driven behaviors are not reinforced under ambiguity. It thus seems that 
excuse-driven motivations do not interfere in the formation of ambiguity 
preferences.
Session Topic: Social Norms (Room 006)
•	 Fabien Accominotti. ‘The Reification of Performance and the Legitimacy 
of Inequality: Theory and Experimental Evidence.’
Authors: Fabien Accominotti,  Daniel Tadmon
Abstract: In this project we argue that the legitimacy of economic 
inequality owes in part to operations that make observers believe in the 
existence of a true hierarchy of worth, performance, or talent between 
the individuals in a population. Specifically, we explore how the reification 
of employee performance in organizations ‘ that is, the presentation of 
performance as a crisp and clear-cut “thing”, such as a rating for example 
‘ contributes to legitimize inequality in employee compensation. The idea 
is that by removing ambiguity and uncertainty around performance (and 
about differences in performance across employees) reification makes 
inequality in compensation more acceptable to those in charge of setting 
compensation levels, and more generally to outside observers.
The project tests this mechanism by asking experiment participants to divide 
a $10,000 year-end bonus between three employees based on the reading 
of their annual performance reports. (The employees, who occupy similar, 
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junior positions at a medium-sized U.S. firm, are fictional, but participants are 
not told so, and performance reports are designed to be as realistic-looking 
as possible). Participants are randomly assigned to two main conditions. In 
the first one, which we refer to as the “non-reified” condition, the reports 
are narrative evaluations. While it is relatively clear from these reports 
which employee is better and which is worse, there remains some ambiguity 
about their relative performance by the mere virtue of the narrative format. 
In the “reified” condition, in contrast, participants read the same narrative 
reports accompanied by a crisp rating of the employees’ performance on 
a verbal scale, ranging from “unacceptable” to “exceptional.” To make sure 
that these ratings accurately reflect the underlying performance of each 
employee ‘ so that the difference between conditions is only the greater 
or lesser degree of reification of performance ‘ we first ask an independent 
group of participants to rate the initial, narrative reports, and we feed these 
ratings into the reports participants see in the reified condition.
The experiment, which was preregistered with the Open Science Framework 
and run through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk with a sample of over 3,100 
respondents in the United States, shows that participants in the reified 
condition are indeed more willing to reward the three employees unequally, 
even though the relative performances of employees are the same across 
conditions. The bonus gap between low- and high-performing employees 
increases by a substantial 20%, from $1,888 to $2,256, between the non-
reified and reified conditions. It rises by an additional 10% between the 
non-reified condition and an extra condition where employee ratings are 
presented as quantified scores. This means that evaluation devices such 
as ratings and rankings do not just artificially reify the merit and ability of 
individuals in the workplace. In doing so they also make us more accepting 
of the idea that different individuals are indeed more or less talented and 
valuable, thereby increasing our willingness to accept unequal rewards 
between them. This has direct implications for understanding the legitimacy 
of economic inequality in contemporary societies ‘ and ultimately for 
working toward a reduction of this inequality.
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•	 Hugh Sibly. ‘Are there norms or rules for the fair division of a surplus?’
Authors: Nilss Olekalns, Hugh Sibly and Amy Beth Corman
Abstract: Consider the division of a surplus between two people who 
both contributed to its creation.  Are there rules or norms that guide the 
fair division of the surplus?  Three well known normative rules that have 
emerged from the literature on distributive fairness might guide the answer 
to this question: Strict Egalitarianism (SE), where fairness requires that all 
inequalities are always equalized; Libertarianism (L), where fairness requires 
everybody receives what he or she contributes (produces); and Liberal 
Egalitarianism (LE), where inequalities should only arise from factors under 
individual control (Cappelen et. al., 2007).
In this paper we present an experiment where participants are asked to 
identify the fair play in a series of allocation games (a representation 
of a coordination game which can be interpreted as determining the 
allocation of as surplus). Participants are truthfully told that the payoffs in 
these coordination games were determined by a procedure in a previous 
experiment. In the prior experiment, the contribution to the underlying 
surplus was determined in one treatment by the participant’s effort and in 
the other treatment by luck.  These allocation games have two equilibria, 
one which represent the allocation of the surplus by individual contribution 
and the other by equal division.  
Participants in the current experiment were paid when they identified the 
same fair allocation as the most popular choice by other participants in 
their session. If the fair division represents the focal point equilibrium, the 
most popular choice can be interpreted as corresponding to the commonly 
adopted fair sharing rule.
We find that there is no social norm of fairness that correspond to SE, LE or 
L. However there does appear to be systematic influences on the choices 
made by participants: the increased size of the surplus and a reduction 
in the difference of individual contributions to the surplus increase the 
frequency that the 50/50 sharing rule is identified as fair. Furthermore, 
individuals who exhibit a high level of the personality trait `conscientious’ 
also are more likely to identify the 50/50 sharing rule as fair.  We do not 
find any gender effects
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•	 David Kingsley. ‘Distributive Justice and Trust.’
Abstract: After participating in a real effort task (the slider task) one 
of each pair of participants is able to distribute the combined earnings.  
Previous research suggests that subjects reveal a self-serving bias in the 
distributions chosen.  This paper asks whether the expectation of future 
interaction will alter the observed distributions . Are preferences for 
distributive justice strategic? In this case, the future interaction is a Trust 
Game (TG) to be played among the same partnered pairs of participants. 
Across treatments participants may or may not have full information 
concerning the TG. Preliminary results (data collection is on-going) suggest 
that when dictators are aware of the TG, chosen distributions are less selfish 
and more consistent with Just Deserts (each get the proportion of the total 
that they produced). The greater level of distributive justice (fewer selfish 
distributions) in the full information treatment leads to larger transfers 
from the first mover to the second more, and, importantly, also to larger 
back-transfers from the second mover to the first mover. Interestingly, this 
effect is only observed when the dictator acts as the first mover and is 
not observed when the dictator acts as the second mover. This suggests, 
although data remains limited, that strategic considerations of intent play 
an important role in distributive preferences, trust, and reciprocation.
•	 Christiane Schwieren. ‘The effect of experience on social norm perception in 
laboratory experiment participants.’
Authors: Robert Schmidt; Christiane Schwieren; Alec Sproten
Abstract: Economic research makes extensive use of laboratory 
experiments for studying individual behavior in a controlled environment. 
However, methodological limitations of laboratory experiments are 
increasingly the focus of discussion. One important point is the question of 
generalizability in general, and the representativeness of the participants 
in experiments more specifically. While older criticism focused on the 
fact that students are not representative for a general population, 
recent papers also discuss whether volunteers are representative for the 
population from which they are drawn, i.e. the pool of students (e.g. Slonim 
et. Al, 2013; Cleave et al., 2013; Falk et al., 2013). Another line of literature 
discusses whether laboratory participants behave differently depending 
on the experience they have with economic experiments (Cleave et al. 
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2013, Benndorf et al., 2017). In the current paper, we focus on the latter 
and report an experiment to shed further light on behavioral effects of 
extensive laboratory participation by studying how the perception of 
social norms differs between experienced and inexperienced participants 
of laboratory experiments. We compare descriptive norms and injunctive 
norms for behavior within the laboratory context and perceptions about 
socially appropriate behavior between the lab context and a real world 
context. Finally, we elicit perceptions about how behavior in the laboratory 
relates to behavior in the field. We find that differences in descriptive 
norms about behavior within the laboratory context are by far the most 
important difference between the two groups we study ‘ “new” participants 
or “lab rats” with at least 10 participations.  Injunctive norms do also differ 
between the two groups, but to a lower extent. It seems as if inexperienced 
participants have na&iuml;ve expectations about how subjects treat each 
other in laboratory experiments. Once they learn how “normal” or average 
behavior looks like in the laboratory, they adapt their perception about 
socially appropriate behavior and, consequently, their own behavior. We 
find no evidence for selection effects with respect to (inductively) socially 
appropriate behavior in the real world. We thus conclude that participants of 
laboratory experiments are representative for the pool that they are drawn 
from, but experience in the lab shapes their behavior and expectations for 
that specific context.
Session Topic: Public Goods (Room 009)
•	 Jonathan Livermore. ‘Two strikes and you’re out!  
An experiment on exclusion.’
Abstract: To date, research conducted on exclusion in cooperative work 
settings has only examined forms of exclusion without the need for prior 
warning. However, in many cases poor performers have to receive a warning 
in the form of a strike prior to being excluded from their group. This study 
provides a comparison between a two-strike exclusion policy and a zero-
tolerance exclusion policy as a means for fostering cooperation in groups. 
We address the following research questions: (i) how do group members 
respond to receiving strikes, and (ii) how effective is a two-strike exclusion 
policy relative to a zero-tolerance exclusion policy? The results from our 
experiment suggest that group members tend to cooperate more after 
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receiving a strike. However, requiring group members to issue strikes to 
one another prior to exclusion seemed to be less effective than allowing for 
exclusion without prior receipt of strikes. As a result, a zero-tolerance policy 
for excluding free riders may indeed be the most effective and efficient 
form of exclusion for fostering cooperation in groups.
•	 Hande Erkut. ‘Endogenous contribution to local vs.  
global public goods with varying communication networks.’
Authors: Hande Erkut and Ernesto Reuben
Abstract: One particular problem with the contributions to public goods 
is whether to contribute to a less efficient local public good that will have 
positive externality for a small amount of people or to a more efficient 
global public good that will have positive externality for a larger population. 
We study whether allowing for partial communication can be harmful by 
leading people to contribute to less efficient local public good instead 
of the global public good. Results suggest that partial as opposed to full 
communication result in a decrease in global public good contributions.
•	 Anna Rita Bennato. ‘Learning by (not) doing.  
Behavioral spillovers in team production with coordinated punishment.’
Authors: Katarina Dankova, Enrique Fatas , and Antonio J Morales
Abstract: This paper reports on an experiment designed to test the 
effectiveness of coordinated punishment in teams. In our setting, 
participants decide how much to contribute to a team account in the first 
stage of the game and punish other team members in the second. While 
team production technology is linear, punishment requires coordination, as 
punishers pay in full the points they send but only the minimum number 
of points is received by punished participants. We study how the presence 
of an enforcing institution in one domain (sanctions) shapes behavior in 
another (contributions). We compare two punishment institutions (of 
High and Low effectiveness) with three benchmarks (with and without 
punishment). Coordinated punishment significantly, but moderately, 
increases contributions in both the High and Low conditions, and 
significantly increases earnings only in the former. We find strong evidence 
of behavioral spillovers between the punishment and contribution stages 
in the High condition. Successful teams learn to contribute most of their 
endowment without learning to punish, as they fail to coordinate sanctions.
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•	 Duk Gyoo Kim. ‘Penalty Lottery.’
Abstract: I propose a new institution, penalty lottery, to control sequential 
public bad productions under imperfect monitoring for punishment: A 
violator (a citizen who produced a public bad and got monitored) hands 
over the fine to the next potential violator with some probability, and pays 
all the accumulated fines with the complementary probability. Although the 
overall fraction of violators eventually approaches zero, it takes substantial 
time periods when heterogeneities in citizen’s attributes including risk 
preferences are considered. The penalty lottery self-selects those who are 
more willing to produce a public bad, and hence endogenously imposes the 
larger expected fines to them. The penalty lottery has advantages over the 
day fine system in which the fine payment depends on the offender’s daily 
personal income, as it can endogenously implement the day fine system. 
From lab experiments with abstract framing, I find strong support of the 
theoretical predictions.
Parallel Sessions III. (3:35 PM – 5:05 PM)
Session Topic: Lying (Room LH007)
•	 Marie Claire Villeval. ‘Fraud, Reputation and Competition.’ 
Authors: Chloe Tergiman and Marie Claire Villeval
Abstract: We study whether fraudulent announcements of high returns by 
project managers can be mitigated by reputation and by the introduction 
of standard market mechanisms. In our laboratory experiment project 
managers announce to potential investors the likely return of their funds. 
Announcements are cheap talk and lies can be potentially detected ex 
post by investors. We compare four treatments. In the Control treatment 
one investor is matched with one project manager and pairs are reshuffled 
at each new period. In the Reputation-No Competition treatment one 
investor is matched with one project manager and pairs remain fixed. In 
the Competition-No-Reputation treatment each investor is matched with 
two project managers and groups are randomly rematched in each period.
Finally, in the Competition-Reputation treatment each investor is matched 
with the same two project managers throughout the session. We find that 
reputation reduces the relative frequency of lies without eliminating fraud. 
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Instead of encouraging more honesty, market mechanisms lead project 
managers to inflate even more their announcements to attract investors. 
Reputation in competitive markets reduces fraud but cannot eliminate 
the negative effect of competition on ethics. The experiment shows also 
evidence of strategic downward lying.
•	 Quazi Shahriar. ‘Deception: The Role of Uncertain Consequences.’
Abstract: We study how decisions to lie extend to risky environments. We 
provide experimental evidence from a sender-receiver game where there is 
uncertainty over the amount by which a sender’s lie reduces its receiver’s 
payoff, which is known only to potential liar. Even though all reduction 
amounts are equiprobable, ex-post beliefs elicited from senders suggest 
that, unlike truth-tellers, most liars underestimate the extent of the actual 
reduction in the receiver’s payoff and appear to exploit this self-serving bias, 
resulting in substantially more lying relative to a baseline treatment without 
the uncertainty. Subsequent treatments confirm the bias by either providing 
additional evidence or by removing possible confounds. An intervention 
treatment nudging senders toward correcting the bias reduces lying.
•	 Tobias Gesche. ‘Honesty in the Digital Age.’
Authors: Alain Cohn, Tobias Gesche and Michel Maréchal
Abstract: Modern communication technologies enable efficient exchange 
of information, but often sacrifice direct human interaction inherent in more 
traditional forms of communication. This raises the question of whether 
the lack of personal interaction induces individuals to exploit informational 
asymmetries. We conducted two experiments with 866 subjects to examine 
how human versus machine interaction influences cheating for financial 
gain. We find that individuals cheat significantly more when they interact 
with a machine rather than a person, regardless of whether the machine is 
equipped with human features. When interacting with a human, individuals 
are particularly reluctant to report unlikely favorable outcomes, which is 
consistent with social image concerns. The second experiment shows that 
dishonest individuals prefer to interact with a machine when facing an 
opportunity to cheat. Our results suggest that human interaction is key to 
mitigating dishonest behavior and that self-selection into communication 
channels can be used to screen for dishonest people
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•	 Georgia Michailidou. ‘Interdependent Lying Costs: Theory and 
Experimental Evidence.’
Authors: Colzani Paola,  Georgia Michailidou,  Luís Santos-Pinto
Abstract: We use a theoretical model to consider interdependent lying 
costs. That is, whether individuals’ decision to lie in a deception game 
differs in environments where i) individuals act alone, ii) individuals observe 
others’ decision to lie, iii) individuals form beliefs about others’ decision to 
lie. The model projects a number of equilibria depending on whether lies 
are substitutes (individuals lie less when they observe/believe others lie), 
or complements (individuals lie more when they observe/believe others 
lie). Then, we use a lab experiment with multiple treatment variations to 
document any empirical manifestation of lying costs interdependency and 
whether sequential play generates more lying than simultaneous play.
Session Topic: Decision Theory (Room 004)
•	 Anthony Newell. ‘Weighting for a refined prospect.’
Authors: Anthony Newell &  Lionel Page
Abstract: It is well established that individuals tend to overweight small 
probabilities while under-weighting large ones, producing and “inverted-S” 
shaped probability weighting function.  Traditionally in studying this area 
the two most common forms of presenting lotteries are through either a 
written statement of the outcomes, or through a visual representation of 
the outcome, usually in the form of a pie chart.  In both cases the lotteries 
usually have only two outcomes.  We investigate if the use of more granular 
(noisy) statistical information will increase probability weighting errors.  In 
an experimental setting participants are asked to choose between lotteries 
pairs which have between three and six outcomes.  Using a within subject 
treatment the presented lotteries have a probability granularity of either 
chances in six or chances in 20.  We hypothesis that the more granular 
lottery (chances in 20) will have a less linear probability weighting function 
due to the non-stochastic noise in their presentation.
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•	 Despoina Alempaki. ‘Preference Reversals under Strategic Uncertainty.’
Authors: Despoina Alempaki, Graham Loomes
Abstract: The “preference reversal phenomenon,” a systematic disparity 
between people’s valuations and choices, poses a fundamental challenge to 
the usual assumptions of well-defined preferences. To date, the numerous 
works that have examined preference reversals involve risky or ambiguous 
gambles in non-interactive environments. However, in many important 
economic, political and social situations uncertainty is strategic and arises 
from the difficulty of predicting other agents’ actions. In this paper we 
investigate: (i) whether preference reversals still occur under situations of 
strategic uncertainty and (ii) if so, how they compare to preference reversals 
under non-strategic settings. Our results show that preference reversals are 
robust to environments of strategic uncertainty.
•	 Bachir Kassas. ‘Happy to Take Some Risk: A More Accurate Assessment 
of the Dependence of Risk Preferences on Mood.’
Authors: Bachir Kassas, Marco A. Palma, Maria Porter
Abstract: There is a vast literature on the effect of mood on individual 
risk preferences with two main hypotheses. While the mood maintenance 
hypothesis (MMH) predicts increased risk-aversion with positive mood and 
vice versa (Isen and Patrick, 1983; Arkes et al.,1988; Mano, 1992; Nygren 
et al., 1996; Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Kring, 2000), the affect 
infusion model (AIM) carries an opposite view (Lerner et al., 2004; Kugler 
et al., 2012; Spies et al., 1997; Nguyen and Noussair, 2014). In this study, 
we utilize facial expression analysis technology in order to provide a more 
accurate investigation of the effect of induced mood on risk preferences. 
Moreover, we test for a dilution effect which we conjecture is present in 
the three-stage experimental design that is commonly adopted when 
tackling this question. We apply two popular risk preference elicitation 
tasks constructed by Holt-Laury (HL) and Eckel-Grossman (EG) in order 
to examine potential differences in treatment effects across tasks. We find 
strong evidence that positive mood stimulates more risk-seeking behavior. 
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This result was consistent across risk preference elicitation methods, 
although it was more pronounced in the HL task. Furthermore, this result 
only became apparent when considering the undiluted group of individuals, 
who did not follow the conventional three-stage design and did not have 
their induced mood diluted prior to reporting their risk preferences. As for 
the effect of negative mood, it was more task-dependent. While undiluted 
individuals displayed slightly more risk-seeking behavior in the HL task, no 
effect was found in the EG task. We conclude that the results are more 
supportive of the AIM, with weak evidence favoring the MMH in the negative 
mood domain. Furthermore, we argue that the divergent results found in 
the literature might arise from the issues inherent in the conventional mood 
measurement methods and differences in the risk preference tasks used to 
measure risk preferences. 
•	 Yohanes Eko Riyanto. ‘Halo Effect in Human-Robot Interaction:  
How Chatbot Influences Human Decision Making Under Risk.’
Authors: Yunfeng Lu, Yohanes Eko Riyanto, Xing Zhang, Georgios Christopoulos
Abstract: Chatbot, an artificial intelligence robot conducting conversation 
with human, becomes increasingly popular in contemporary websites and 
applications. There is little evidence documenting how this conversational 
robot affects human’s judgment and decision making. In this study, we 
investigate the role of chatbot interface in people’s risk decision making in 
a cost-loss game using lab experiments. The robot’s role is to give advice to 
the human decision maker whether to take a risk of a loss or pay a cost to 
avoid the risk. Before the start of the economic game, the decision maker 
can have a 5 minutes’ chat with the robot. We exogenously manipulate the 
quality of chat between human and robot in a novel experimental system, 
and find that participants’ subsequent decision to follow the robot’s advice 
or not is systematically influenced by the chat quality. In addition, we find 
that this influence of chat quality on human decision is mainly due to 
people’s perceived intelligence of the robot, rather than emotions or social 
distance. These findings are consistent with the halo effect that people 
overly rely on the robot’s intelligence in chatting to infer its competence in 
giving economic advice.
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Session Topic: Field Experiments (Room 005)
•	 Tomomi Tanaka. ‘The relationship between conflicts, economic shocks, 
and death with depression, economic activities.’
Authors: Julian Jamison, Kevin Robert McGee, Gbemisola Oseni, Julie 
Perng, Ryoko Sato, Tomomi Tanaka, Renos Vakis
Abstract: This paper examines the links between adverse events, 
depression, and decision-making in Nigeria. It investigates how events such 
as conflicts, shocks, and deaths can affect both short-term perceptions of 
welfare, as well as longer term decisions on economic activities and human 
capital investments. First, we find that exposure to conflict has the largest 
and strongest relationship with depression, associated with an 88 percent 
increase in the probability of reporting depressive symptoms. This is the 
equivalent of a reduction in income by around $34 USD (4.4 percent of the 
average income of households in this sample). Second, we randomize the 
timing of the shocks module with respect to the mental health one. We find 
that individuals who were reminded about their history of adverse events 
have a 10 percent higher probability of reporting depressive symptoms. 
Our final sets of results show that depression is associated with lower labor 
force participation and child educational investment. People with depressive 
symptoms are 8 percent less likely to work; this is driven by a reduction in 
engagement in agricultural activities for men and self-employment for women. 
In addition, households with a parent exhibiting depressive symptoms spend 
20 percent less on education. These results are suggestive of a direct link 
between mental health, welfare perceptions and decision-making, beyond 
the indirect one that can come via exposure to adverse effects.
•	 Klarizze Puzon. ‘Regional identity and intergenerational resource 
conflict: an experiment in Guinea.’
Authors: Klarizze PUZON, Ruth TACNENG, Thierno BARRY,  
Marc WILLINGER
Abstract: We examine the impact of regional fragmentation and ethnicity 
on behavior in an intergenerational game of non-renewable resource 
extraction. The dynamic game has a new generation of players every period. 
It is characterized by shocks endogenously caused by players’ extraction 
decisions. After a given threshold, the resource suddenly drops to lower 
values. We present a two-player, framed field experiment on a sample of 
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Fulani (ethnic majority group) and Malinke (minority group) participants in 
Guinea-Conakry, Sub-Saharan Africa. We frame instructions in the context 
of bauxite, the natural resource that Guinea’s economy is heavily dependent 
on. Our main treatment variable is the ethnically-inclined region of origin 
of the two players. Preliminary results suggest that regional fragmentation 
significantly affects the behavior of the majority group, the Fulani. Across 
time, Fulani tribal members tend to choose lower extraction rates, are less 
likely to deplete the resource, and thus implicitly more concerned of future 
generations. This is more prevalent when they are paired with a player of 
the same social identity as theirs.
•	 Nicholas Haas. ‘Improving Women’s Access to Justice in a Context of 
Legal Pluralism: Two Experiments on Short and Long-term Approaches in 
Somalia.’
Authors: Nicholas Haas, Prabin Khadka
Abstract: States with high-functioning formal institutions perform better 
on a wide range of outcomes and offer particular promise for vulnerable 
populations, such as women, that face bias from traditional informal 
institutions. But building strong formal institutions can take decades, and in 
recent years scholars and policymakers have sought to provide individuals 
with access to justice through improvements to informal institutional 
alternatives. In Somalia, formal courts that offer a mix of secular and Islamic 
(Sharia) law coexist alongside two alternatives: courts run by Islamist 
militant group al-Shabaab that enforce a strict brand of Sharia law, and 
dispute resolution bodies led by traditional clan and religious elders. We 
ask and seek to answer two questions in this context of legal pluralism. 
First, what can be done to increase access to justice for women in the 
short-term? We conduct a randomized controlled trial to evaluate whether 
a United Nations program that provides alternative Quranic interpretations 
and non-violent communication training to women and traditional leaders 
changes attitudes and norms about women and gender-based violence, 
and improves informal institutional responsiveness to women. Second, 
what can increase usage of formal institutions, particularly by women, in 
the long-term? We conduct a conjoint experiment across 40 districts with 
over 600 subjects to evaluate what leads individuals to seek adjudication 
of disputes by al-Shabaab, the central obstacle to the establishment of the 
rule of law, and not formal courts or traditional elders.
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•	 Lamis Saleh. ‘Punishment Patterns, Violence, and Distress among Syrian 
Civil War Victims in Syria: A Lab-in-the-Fi.’
Authors: Nora El-Bialy, Elisa Fraile Aranda, Andreas Nicklisch, Lamis 
Saleh, Stefan Voigt
Abstract: Since the year 2011, a brutal civil war has been taking place in 
Syria. An uncounted number of people is internally displaced or have fled 
the country. Although participants differ in the area where they reside in 
Syria, the vast majority of them have experienced severe violence on a daily 
basis. We ran a series of online and lab-in-the-field experiments with Syrians 
in Syria- both in government controlled and uncontrolled areas- and with 
Syrian refugees who escaped the civil war to Jordan. We test their pro-
social and cooperative behavior in sequential modified prisoners’ dilemmas 
and modified ultimatum games. We identify unusual punishment schemes 
responding to breaches of pro-sociality and cooperativeness. Participants 
with more exposure to violence are more likely to depict unconditional 
punishment harshly.
Session Topic: Discrimination (Room 006)
•	 Graeme Pearce. ‘Discrimination in British Carvery Restaurants.’
Authors: Brit Grosskopf and Graeme Pearce
Abstract: We present a natural field experiment designed to examine 
price discrimination in British carvery restaurants. Carvery restaurants 
serve traditional British roast dinners, and are characterised by the manner 
in which customers are served: a single chef serves every customer 
individually and, under observation, cuts them a portion of meat from a 
roasted joint. We employed 147 testers to pose as customers, each of which 
paid the same price for an identical meal. We find systematic variations in 
served meat quantities that correlate with the testers’ gender, with men 
receiving significantly more meat than women. However, this disparity is 
almost entirely explained by variation in the testers’ height. Evidence from a 
complementary framed field experiment highlights how female willingness 
to pay is highly sensitive to information about the disparity, whilst males 
are unaffected
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•	 Kristine Koutout. ‘Second-Order Beliefs and Gender in the Lab.’
Authors: Andrew Dustan, Kristine Koutout, Greg Leo
Abstract: Sometimes, men and women are different. More often, people 
believe men and women are different, and these beliefs affect decisions. 
For example, an engineering professor who believes that men are better 
than women at technical research may invest more time into advising 
male graduate students. A manager who believes that men are tougher 
negotiators may give men raises more frequently. Beliefs about others’ 
beliefs about men and women may also affect outcomes. For example, a 
women may choose not to pursue engineering because she believes that 
professors believe that men are better than women at technical research 
(and thus invest less time in women). She might also refrain from requesting 
raises if she thinks her manager believes women are weak negotiators. The 
existence of these second-order beliefs may lead to uneven outcomes, 
even if the beliefs are not accurate. Thus, second-order beliefs may be an 
important source of unequal economic outcomes. We provide the first direct 
measurements of second-order gender beliefs using a lab experiment and 
find that, while a majority of people believe men and women differ in a math 
task and a bargaining task, their second-order beliefs are distorted (with 
respect to true first-order beliefs of others) in ways that may perpetuate 
these differences. Our lab experiment considers two separate tasks. In the 
first task, subjects are asked to add sets of five two-digit numbers. In the 
second task, an abstract bargaining environment, individuals choose their 
minimum acceptable offer in an ultimatum game. There are three phases of 
the experiment. In the “primary task” phase several participants completed 
the two tasks. In the first-order” beliefs phases, participants are incentivized 
to reveal their beliefs about how men and women performed in the primary 
task phase. In the “first and second-order” beliefs phases, participants are 
incentivized to reveal both their first-order beliefs about how men and 
women performed in the primary task phase (first-order beliefs) and also 
their beliefs about what men and women reported in the first-order belief 
phase (second-order beliefs). This final stage provides the data for our 
analysis. An important design feature in our experiment is that participants 
are always asked to reveal their beliefs about participants who are not in 
their session. This eliminates judgments based on any observables besides 
gender. To incentivize subjects’ belief elicitation we use the binarized 
scoring rule with a payoff function that is proper for the median. This 
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elicitation is incentive-compatible for subjects’ median beliefs regardless 
of risk preferences. The experiment was conducted at the Vanderbilt 
Experimental Economics Lab (VUEEL) in November 2017 - January 2018. 
80 men and 77 women participated and earned an average of $18.09 for 
participating in sessions of roughly 30 minutes. We find strong evidence 
that a majority of people believe that a majority of men believe that men 
will outperform women on the math task. In sharp contrast, participants 
have widely varying beliefs about women’s estimation of men and women’s 
relative math ability. Second order beliefs with respect to the ultimatum 
game are more consistent. We find evidence that majority of people 
believe that both a majority of men and a majority of women believe that 
men choose a higher minimum acceptable offers in the ultimatum game. 
We also quantify the distortion between first order and second-order 
beliefs and find that participants tend to overestimate the extent to which 
men’s beliefs “favor” men and underestimate the extent to which women’s 
beliefs “favor” men. By identifying these (distorted) second-order beliefs 
about gender in the lab, we have taken a first step toward quantifying the 
role that higher-order beliefs about gender differences play in markets and 
strategic interactions. Our paper also provides a useful methodological 
contribution in establishing a well-controlled method to elicit second-order 
beliefs. This methodology may be used for studying beliefs about a wide 
variety of characteristics and behaviors where those beliefs may play an 
important role in determining divergent gender outcomes.
•	 Jing Li. ‘Gender-biased task assignment:  
Evidence from a laboratory experiment.’
Authors: Jing Li, Patrick McGuire
Abstract: We ask whether men receive lucrative tasks more often than 
equally capable women so that a gender pay gap arises due to the 
difference in the earnings potential. Our subjects allocate a standard task 
and a challenging yet lucrative task between two workers, knowing each 
worker’s past performance, task preference, and sex. We find that men 
receive the lucrative task more often than women, but the difference can 
largely be explained by past performance and a gender difference in task 
preference. A large fraction of workers shies away from the lucrative tasks, 
suggesting that the subjects may incur a psychic cost when the tasks are 
challenging. The gender difference in task preference leads to a gender 
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difference in the earnings potential. Managers choose the efficient task 
allocation less often when the workers’ preferences go against rather 
than with their money-incentive. The result suggests that managers show 
concern for the subjective utilities of the workers.
•	 Francisco Lagos. ‘Obesity Discrimination in Hiring:  
a natural field experiment.’
Authors: Francisco Lagos, Catarina Goulao, Juan A. Lacomba,  
Dan Olof-Rooth 
Abstract: This article regards the discrimination of overweight and 
obese individuals in the labor market. Our objective is twofold. First, we 
aim to quantify the degree of discrimination towards the overweight 
and obese individuals in the labor market. Second, we aim to shed some 
light on the mechanisms driving such discrimination. Understanding the 
mechanisms responsible for obesity discrimination is absolutely necessary 
in view of advising the relevant policy recommendations. In the absence of 
appropriate data, we will rely on a field experiment, designed specifically 
for our purposes.
Specifically, and following Riach and Rich (2002), pairs of equal fictitious 
applications have been sent to real job openings advertisements. They 
will be identical in all relevant employment characteristics, except in one 
characteristic: photo, one obese and the other of normal weight. Also, 
we want to understand how social norms concerning obesity may affect 
discrimination. To this end we will carry out our field experiment in different 
European regions that capture diverse social norms as regards obesity.
In particular, we will verify the existence or not of discrimination due to 
obesity in the processes of contracting the labor market. The results of 
the same, in addition, will allow us to make international and interregional 
comparisons between and within four important European countries. 
Finally, the results might contribute a better understanding of the 
mechanisms that lead to discrimination in the hiring of obese people, and 
thus could contribute to a more effective design of the policies that fight 
against labor discrimination, an issue that affects an increasingly large part 
of the population.
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Session Topic: Preferences (Room 009)
•	 Zeeshan Samad. ‘Trust and Treachery in Genetic Data Privacy.’
Authors: Zeeshan Samad, Myrna Wooders, Bradley Malin, Eugene 
Vorobeychik
Abstract: Given that individuals are concerned about misuse of their 
genetic data, do they feel that the overall benefit from a genetic test is 
greater than its harms? We elicit people’s concern about privacy of their 
genetic data and their motivations for sharing their genetic data. Our 
experiment uses framing effects to test if people are willing to risk the 
privacy of their genetic data to get a health benefit. Since this decision can 
depend on individual-level characteristics, we compare this outcome with 
an identical problem but framed differently; that problem tests if people 
are willing to risk their financial data privacy to get a monetary benefit. We 
use a four-treatment experiment design to decompose the different factors 
that motivate people to risk their genetic (or financial) data for a health (or 
monetary) benefit. The results from our experiment suggest that individuals 
are more willing to risk their genetic data privacy for a health benefit than 
they are willing to risk their financial data privacy for a monetary benefit. 
•	 Xiu Chen. ‘How time flies!’
Authors:  Xiaojian Zhao, Xiu Chen
Abstract: This paper points out a potential identification problem of 
time preference elicitations: the observed intertemporal decisions could 
be driven by a biased perception of time, and thus may not completely 
reveal the true time preference. To test this conjecture, we explore the 
relationship between time perception and the observed intertemporal 
choices by conducting a laboratory experiment, in which cognitive load 
is used as an instrument to manipulate time perception. We find that the 
perceived time lengths for subjects with high cognitive load are shorter 
than those with low cognitive load. Moreover, there is a correlation between 
time underestimation and observed patience. Lastly, the results support 
that time perception mediates part of the cognitive load’s effect on 
intertemporal choices.
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•	 Dominik Duell. ‘Shared Social Identity and Strategic Uncertainty.’
Authors: Dominik Duell, Catherine Hafer, Dimitri Landa
Abstract: Extensive research on social identity suggests that when 
individuals encounter somebody who shares their group identity, they 
make inferences about that person’s attitudes that typically assume greater 
similarity to their own attitudes. Little is known, however, whether and how 
such attributions operate in the context with strategic uncertainty. This 
study induces group identities and then places individuals in a standard 
decision situation featuring strategic uncertainty (stag hunt game). We find 
that behavior in the stag hunt game is robustly identity-match contingent: 
in in-group matches, individuals are more willing to take payoff-dominant 
(riskier) choices. We show that these results are not explainable by 
individuals’ beliefs about the risk preferences of members of their own 
vs. of the other social group, but are influenced by individuals’ pre-game 
experience with the identity group.  We argue that social identity matching 
affects individuals’ strategic uncertainty and that that conclusion provides 
an alternative explanation for the own-group favoring affect and trust 
behavior in strategic settings. Our results call for a re-assessment of the 
standard accounts of such behavior.
•	 Alice Solda. ‘Strategically Delusional’
Authors: Solda A., Ke C., Page L. and W. von Hippel
Abstract: We investigate the idea that overconfidence emerges as 
a strategy to gain an advantage in social interactions. We design an 
experiment where participants complete a general knowledge test and are 
then incentivized either to form accurate beliefs about their performance, 
or to convince a group of other participants that they performed well. 
We also vary the participants’ ability to freely gather information about 
their performance. Our results are consistent with the idea of strategic 
confidence. First, participants are more likely to become overconfident 
when they anticipate that they will benefit from convincing others about 
their performance. Second, in such situations, they tend to actively 
engage in biased information gathering in a way conducive to generating 
overconfident beliefs.
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Parallel Sessions IV. (10:30 AM – 12:00 PM)
Session Topic: Gender and Competition (Room LH007)
•	 Nikos Nikiforakis. ‘Motherhood and the willingness to compete for pay.’
Authors: Aurelie Dariel, Curtis Kephart, Nikos Nikiforakis & Christina Zenker
Abstract: There is a large disparity in the labor market outcomes of mothers 
and non-mothers around the world. Although this so-called ‘motherhood 
gap’ accounts for a substantial, ever-growing fraction of the overall gender 
gap, its causes are not fully understood. We argue that evolutionary and 
social forces are likely to have affected negatively the willingness of women 
to compete for pay after they become mothers. Given the importance of 
competition in modern labor markets, if mothers are less willing to compete 
for pay than non-mothers, it could help explain some of the motherhood gap. 
We test our hypothesis in two experiments, using samples from two very 
different cultural backgrounds. In both studies, mothers are found to be less 
willing to compete than non-mothers. This difference cannot be explained by 
differences in their ability, risk attitudes, beliefs, family background or marital 
status. Survey evidence and matching analysis suggest there is a causal 
link between motherhood and the willingness to compete for pay. We also 
find support for the another hypothesis that fathers are not less willing to 
compete for pay than non-fathers. These findings have important implications 
for policies designed to reduce both the motherhood and the gender gap.
•	 Ernesto Reuben. ‘Competitiveness and the gender gap among young 
business professionals.’
Authors: Ernesto Reuben, Paola Sapienza, Anna Toldra, and Luigi Zingales
Abstract: Important gender differences in earnings and career trajectories 
persist. Particularly, in professions such as business. Gender differences in 
competitiveness have been proposed as a potential explanation. Using an 
incentivized measure of competitiveness, this paper investigates whether 
competitiveness explains future gender differences in earnings and industry 
choice in a sample of high-ability MBA graduates. We find that competitive 
individuals earn 9% more than their less competitive counterparts do upon 
graduation and this difference explains around 10% of the overall gender 
gap. However, the effect of competitiveness on earnings is considerably 
reduced nice years later while the overall gender gap increased.
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•	 Barbora Baisa. ‘Group Membership, Team Payoff and Gender 
Competitiveness.’
Abstract: Nowadays, women represent a larger percentage of positions 
in political life and private sector than ever before. Nevertheless, they still 
remain underrepresented in the leading positions of political systems and 
corporations. Also, the percentage of women in the political life is still 
relatively low. The lack of women in government, positions of presidents 
and prime ministers or other leading functions at all can be partly explained 
by their lower willingness to enter a competition in comparison with men. 
Further to the studies showing that women are equally skilled, educated 
and productive, the question arises how to encourage qualified and high-
performing women to compete. The analysis of the information gathered 
via conducted laboratory experiment shows that inducing a team identity 
(group membership) and team payoff increases competitiveness of 
high-performing women without loss of willingness to compete of high-
performing men. In addition, no significant (neither positive nor negative) 
change in the performance among both men and women was found.
•	 Hirofumi Kurokawa. ‘Ingroup Bias and Willingness to Compete.’
Authors: Hiroko Okudaira, Yusuke Kinari, and Fumio Ohtake
Abstract: We conduct an experimental study to investigate the impact of 
group identity on men and women’s willingness to compete. First, subjects’ 
identities are artificially induced by the minimal group paradigm. A paired 
competitor is randomly assigned. Some subjects are paired with the same 
identity competitor (ingroup) and the others are paired with the different 
identity competitor (outgroup). Second, subjects perform a real effort task 
under a piece rate and then under a competitive tournament. Subjects can 
then choose which compensation scheme to apply in the next round. We 
find that men are more willing to compete against the outgroup competitor 
than the ingroup competitor, while women are not willing to compete 
against the outgroup competitor as well as the ingroup competitor. The 
reason why men are more willing to compote the outgroup competitor is 
that men increase performance and become more overconfidence if the 
competitor is outgroup.
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Session Topic: Markets (Room 004)
•	 Jacopo Magnani. ‘Limited strategic thinking and the cursed match.’
Authors: Jacopo Magnani, Olivier Bochet
Abstract: In marriage and labor markets, information about the attributes 
of the parties involved is often private. Thus, optimal matching decisions 
require agents to engage in sophisticated strategic thinking. In this paper 
we use a laboratory experiment to study matching under imperfect 
information. We analyze subjects’ behavior in a game where being 
accepted confers bad news about a potential partner’s type. We find that 
subjects propose to form matches when Bayes-Nash equilibrium predicts 
they should not. This behavior is consistent with a cursed equilibrium model 
in which players fail to understand adverse selection and thus overestimate 
the value of matching. We propose a series of treatments to rule out 
alternative explanations.
•	 Lukas Wenner. ‘Cursed Buyers in the Marketplace.’
Abstract: It is well known that in many situations, economic agents exhibit 
limited strategic thinking, in particular when it comes to correctly inferring 
information from others’ actions. Such inferences, however, are crucial for 
optimal behavior in markets with asymmetric information and potential 
adverse selection, because buyers need to understand whether and how 
prices can be used to make inferences about unknown qualities. This paper 
applies cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005) to a model of bilateral 
trade where sellers set take-it-or-leave-it offers and buyers are uninformed 
about the product’s quality. Theoretically, I show that this model predicts 
that (i) all qualities are sold in equilibrium, but the probability with which a 
product is sold decreases in its quality, (ii) prices increase in quality, and (iii) 
buyers make losses (gains) when buying below-average (above-average) 
qualities. I then experimentally investigate these predictions and find 
support for all three, indicating that cursedness predicts market behavior 
well in this context. To directly test this explanation based on limited 
strategic sophistication, I manipulate the degree of buyers’ strategic ability 
in a given market and show that with low ability buyers, consumer welfare 
is lower. At the same time, sellers benefit because more naive buyers 
mitigate effects of adverse selection, since they buy low quality products 
too often. This provides direct evidence that limited strategic reasoning 
has detrimental effects on consumer welfare in these markets and that the 
concept of cursedness organizes behavior remarkably well.
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•	 Peter Katuscak. ‘Strategy-proofness Made Simple.’ 
Authors: Peter Katuscak and Thomas Kittsteiner
Abstract: There is a growing evidence that many people do not report their 
preferences truthfully in strategy-proof mechanisms. As examples, consider 
the second-price auction or student-school matching under a strategy-proof 
mechanism. A leading explanation of this observation is game complexity, 
manifesting itself through a large number of contingencies that a player 
needs to consider to see that reporting truthfully is weakly dominant. We 
propose a novel way of framing any strategy-proof mechanism that aims to 
reduce the ensuing cognitive load on players. First, a player’s reported type 
is used to determine opportunity sets of the other players, whereas reported 
types of the other players are used to determine the opportunity set of the 
player in question. Second, a player’s private allocation is determined as 
(one of) the most preferred allocation(s) in her opportunity set according 
to her reported preference type. We then experimentally test whether 
this framing increases truthful reporting relative to ``traditional’’ frames 
using top trading cycles (and plan to do so for deferred acceptance and 
second-price auction in the near future). We find that the proposed framing 
increases the rate of truthful reporting by almost one half. Moreover, there is 
no effect for low numeracy subjects, whereas the rate of truthful reporting 
more than doubles for high-numeracy subjects.
•	 Fuhai Hong. ‘Concentration and Unpredictability of Forecasts in Artificial 
Investment Games: An Online Experiment.’
Authors: Xiu Chen, Xiaojian Zhao, Fuhai Hong
Abstract: This paper is the first to use the WeChat platform, one of 
the largest social networks, to conduct an online experiment of artificial 
investment games. We investigate how people’s forecasts about the 
financial market are shaped by the environment, in which they interact 
before making investment decisions. Our treatments manipulate whether 
subjects can observe others’ forecasts and whether subjects engage in 
public or private investment decisions. We find that subjects’ forecasts 
significantly converge when shared, though in different directions across 
groups. Thus, information sharing does not necessarily lead to better 
decisions. We also observe a strong positive correlation between forecasts 
and investments, suggesting that an individual’s reported forecast is 
associated with his belief.
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Session Topic: Repeated Games (Room 005)
•	 Binglin Gong. ‘Cooperation through Indirect Reciprocity:  
Impact of Higher-Order History.’
Authors: Binglin Gong, Chun-Lei Yang
Abstract: How people use acquired higher-order information to aid 
cooperation decisions is an open empirical question. We conduct a random 
matching prisoners’ dilemma experiment with optional history information 
up to the second order, that is, including the action history of the partner’s 
previous partners. Using our newly defined continuous extension of 
some well-known reputation scores, we find that standing and judging 
scores significantly affect the cooperation decision. More than half of our 
subjects respond to the higher-order scores, and incorporating individual 
heterogeneity in aggregate regressions greatly improves the overall fit. 
People learn to use the judging score through their experience of being 
cheated. The reputation effect is stronger when people have first played the 
baseline prisoner’s dilemma game without information, whereby subjects 
are more cooperative when both parties display high reputation scores. 
Moreover, the level of information-induced improvement in cooperation 
is significantly lower in the control treatments where only first-order 
information is provided.
•	 Melis Kartal. ‘A New Approach to the Analysis of Cooperation Under the 
Shadow of the Future: Theory and Experiments.’
Authors: Wieland Müller, Melis Kartal
Abstract: The theory of infinitely repeated games lacks predictive power 
due to equilibrium multiplicity and its insensitivity to, for example, changes 
in certain parameters, the timing of players’ moves or communication 
possibilities. We propose a new approach, which mitigates the shortcomings 
of the theory. In particular, we study a standard infinitely repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma game and its variants with (i) heterogeneous tastes 
for cooperation, and (ii) strategic risk arising from incomplete information 
about the opponent’s taste for cooperation. We theoretically show that 
the variants we study reduce strategic risk and boost cooperation and 
coordination on cooperation relative to the standard game, unlike what a 
theory based on pure material self-interest of players would predict. Our 
theoretical results are corroborated by the results of our experiments. 
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•	 Maoliang Ye. ‘Does Gradualism Build Cooperation?  
A Finitely Repeated Investment Experiment.’
Authors: Xiangting Hu, Maoliang Ye
Abstract: This paper examines the effect of gradualism ‘ increasing the 
stake of investment slowly over time rather than requiring a high stake 
of investment immediately ‘ in co-operation building using a finitely 
repeated binary trust (investment) experiment. The experimental results 
find that gradualism helps build high-stake cooperation in the investment 
relationship: The gradualism treatment has a higher initial reciprocation 
rate of the trustee, which leads to higher rates of subsequent investment 
from the trustor and successful mutual cooperation among the trustor and 
the trustee. However, the rates of investment, reciprocation and mutual 
cooperation for all treatments sharply decrease in the end (“end-of-game” 
effect). Our results are consistent with a  behavioral game theory model, 
but not with the standard game theory predictions.
•	 Andrea Isoni. ‘Trust and Mutual Benefit.’
Authors: Andrea Isoni, Robert Sugden, Jiwei Zheng
Abstract: We conduct an experiment in which randomly-formed pairs of 
participants face repeated opportunities to enter anonymous transactions 
framed as sales of abstract pictures.  Transactions may result in financial 
benefits to either or both parties, depending on the random realisation of 
the exchange price, the charge to deliver the picture, and the benefit to the 
receiving party.  Entering a transaction is voluntary, and based on knowledge 
of the exchange price and delivery charge for the seller, and of price and 
benefit for the buyer.  The transaction is either executed simultaneously, 
or in a sequence that commits the first mover to sustain a cost (either 
the delivery charge if the seller moves first or the exchange price if the 
buyer moves first), exposing them to a loss if the second mover does not 
complete the transaction, as in a binary trust game.  By manipulating the 
frequency with which transactions are executed simultaneously, we study 
whether more frequent exposure to the mutually beneficial simultaneous 
transactions increases trust and trustworthiness when the execution of 
transactions is asynchronous.
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Session Topic: Social Preferences (Room 006)
•	 Romain Gauriot. ‘Altruism or Diminishing Marginal Utility?’
Authors: Romain  Gauriot, Stephanie Heger, Robert Slonim
Abstract: We challenge a commonly used assumption in the literature 
on social preferences and show that this assumption leads to significantly 
biased estimates of the social preference parameter. Using Monte Carlo 
simulations, we demonstrate that the literature’s common restrictions on 
the curvature of the decision-makers utility function can dramatically bias 
the altruism parameter. We show that this is particularly problematic when 
comparing altruism between groups with well-documented differences in 
risk aversion or diminishing marginal utility, i.e., men versus women, giving 
motivated by pure versus warm glow motives, and wealthy versus poor.
•	 Stefania Bortolotti. ‘Hope and Anger:  
An Experiment on Inequality and Disruptive Behavior.’
Authors: Maria Bigoni, Stefania Bortolotti, Efsan Nas Ozen
Abstract: The extent of inequality is a decisive factor in fuelling social 
unrest, but not all inequalities are born alike. By means of a laboratory 
experiment, we investigate how the unequal distribution of monetary 
payoffs can trigger disruptive behavior against people with whom there 
is no previous or expected future contact. In particular, we study whether 
disruptive behavior depends on the levels of inequality only, or conditions 
through which inequality occurs plays a role. To do so, we compare an 
environment in which reducing inequality is safe for the rich with one in 
which reducing inequality puts the rich in a vulnerable position. We find that 
inequality triggers the poor’s disruptive behavior towards rich strangers, 
and that the experience of the same level of inequality leads to a higher 
degree of frustration and disruptive behavior among the poor, in the former, 
as compared to the latter environment. This behavioral change appears to 
be driven by a change in the poor’s expectations on the behavior of the 
rich, which are more optimistic when the rich can safely reduce inequality. 
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•	 Pierluigi Conzo. ‘Was Banfield right?  
New insights from a nationwide laboratory experiment.’
Authors: Arnstein Aassve,  Pierluigi Conzo, Francesco Mattioli
Abstract: The north-south gap in social capital has marked Italy as a 
worldwide example of within-country differences spurring socio-economic 
diversity. External validity and measurement issues in previous studies raise 
doubts about whether differences in social capital reflect indeed a ` national 
syndrome’. Representative data from our nationwide lab-experiment show 
northerners perform better only in trustworthiness, but they are similar to 
southerners in cooperation, trust, beliefs, altruism and risk tolerance. As a 
novel result, the south reciprocates less when the amount at stake increases, 
suggesting the north-south divide is preference-based and sustained by a 
social norm that hinders southerners from rewarding pro-social acts.
•	 Topi Miettinen. ‘Revealed Preferences in a sequential prisoners’ 
dilemma: a horse-race between six utility functions.’
Authors: Topi Miettinen, Michael Kosfeld, Jörgen Weibull, Ernst Fehr
Abstract: We experimentally investigate behavior and beliefs in a 
sequential prisoner’s dilemma. Each subject had to choose an action as 
first-mover and a conditional action as second-mover. All subjects also 
had to state their beliefs about others’ second-mover choices. Using the 
elicited beliefs, we use a novel and intuitively appealing hit-rate approach 
to compare the explanatory power of a few current models of social and 
moral preferences. The data show clear differences in explanatory power 
between the preference models, both without and with control for the 
number of free parameters. The best-performing models explain about 
80% of observed behavior. We also compare the results with a conventional 
maximum-likelihood method, and conclude that results by and large agree. 
We finally use the estimated
preference parameters to identify biases in subjects’ expectations. We find 
a consensus bias (whereby subjects believe others behave like themselves) 
and a slight optimism (whereby subjects overestimate probabilities for 
favorable outcomes).
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Session Topic: Decisions under Risk (Room 009)
•	 Bodo Vogt. ‘Hysteresis and prospect theory -  
A model and its experimental evaluation for order effects.’
Authors: Stephan Schosser, Judith Trarbach, Bodo Vogt
Abstract: Evaluating two experiences of different events is not only 
difficult from a practical perspective, but it is also challenging from a 
theoretical viewpoint. Prospect Theory, Peak-end Rule, and primacy effects 
are approaches which exist to predict the behavior of a decision maker. 
This paper introduces a model, which is based on Prospect Theory and 
hysteresis, that can predict both peak-end rule and primacy effects. In 
addition, we describe an experimental study that shows how both effects, 
as predicted by our model, occur.
•	 Marc Willinger. ‘Consumption smoothing and subjective discounting 
under background risk.’
Authors: Mickaël Beaud, Marc Willinger
Abstract: We provide experimental evidence about wealth allocation 
decisions between two portfolios available at two distinct dates, the sooner 
date 1 (with interest rate r1) and the later date 2 (with interest rate r2&ge; 
r1), in the presence/absence of a multiplicative mean-zero background 
risk (BR). The BR multiplies by a factor 2 or 0 the wealth level with equal 
probability. We consider four situations: no background risk (BR0), 
background risk at the sooner date (BR1), background risk at the later date 
(BR2) and background risk at both dates (BR12). Following Andreoni and 
Sprenger (2002), we vary the delay between the two dates and the interest 
rate. Each subject had to make 15 budget allocations for each situation (5 
pairs of interest rates combined with 3 pairs of dates). We replicate some of 
Andreoni and Sprenger’s (2002) findings. Let &alpha;0 be the fraction of a 
subject’s endowment invested under BR0 in the sooner available portfolio. 
Likewise let us define &alpha;1, &alpha;2 and &alpha;12, the fraction of the 
endowment invested in the sooner available portfolio under BR1, BR2 and 
BR12, respectively. 
We categorize subjects according to their response to background risk with 
respect to &alpha;0. 31.5% are categorized as risk-seekers as they increase 
(decrease) their sooner consumption under BR1 (BR2), i.e. &alpha;2 &lt; 
&alpha;0 &lt; &alpha;1. 25% are risk-avoiders as they decrease (increase) 
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their sooner consumption under BR1 (BR2), i.e. &alpha;2 &gt; &alpha;0 
&gt; &alpha;1. 26.5% are soon-seeker- late-avoiders since they increase 
their sooner consumption under BR1 and BR2, i.e. &alpha;1 &gt; &alpha;0  
and &alpha;2 &gt; &alpha;0. Finally, 3% are categorized as soon-avoider-
late-seekers since they decrease their sooner consumption under BR1 and 
BR2, i.e. &alpha;1 &lt; &alpha;0  and &alpha;2 &lt; &alpha;0. The remaining 
ones (14%) cannot be categorized. Only the preferences of risk-avoiders 
are compatible with the DEU (Discounted Expected Utility) model which 
relies on the assumption of stable risk and time preferences. Furthermore, 
concavity of the utility function under DEU both reflects risk-aversion and 
preference for consumption-smoothing. We suggest that most subjects 
have changing risk and/or time preferences and that such preferences are 
better captured by models that allow to disentangle risk preferences from 
time preferences, such as Kreps & Porteus (1978) or Epstein & Zin (1989).
•	 Sebastian Schneider. ‘Higher Order Risk:  
An Application To Savings of the Poor in Bogota.’
Authors: Marcela Ibanez, Gerhard Riener, Sebastian O. Schneider
Abstract: Higher order risk preferences play an important role in economics, 
most prominently in the theory of saving under uncertainty. Leland (1968) 
suggests that under uncertain income prudent individuals increase savings 
as a precautionary measure. To test this proposition we present a new 
experimental method to elicit higher order risk preferences. The method 
we propose uses a non-parametric estimation of the utility function using 
P-splines. Using this method we can compute well-known theoretically 
derived measures of the intensities of prudence and risk aversion. We 
find comparable results to earlier studies with respect to classification of 
individuals as prudent or imprudent among a sample of poor households in 
Bogota. In addition, the results strongly support the theoretical prediction 
that uncertainty leads to increases in savings for prudent individuals. This 
suggests that this population group lacks alternative options to smooth 
consumption.
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•	 Jonathan Chapman. ‘Loss Attitudes in the U.S. Population:  
Evidence from Dynamically Optimized Sequential Experimentation.’
Authors: Jonathan Chapman; Erik Snowberg; Stephanie Wang;  
Colin Camerer
Abstract: We introduce DOSE - Dynamically Optimized 
Sequential Experimentation - and use it to estimate individual-
level loss aversion in a representative sample of the U.S. population 
(N = 2;000). DOSE elicitations are more accurate, more stable across time, 
and faster to administer than standard methods. We find that around 50% 
of the U.S. population is loss tolerant. This is counter to earlier findings, 
which mostly come from lab/student samples, that a strong majority of 
participants are loss averse. Loss attitudes are correlated with cognitive 
ability: loss aversion is more prevalent in people with high cognitive ability, 
and loss tolerance is more common in those with low cognitive ability. 
We also use DOSE to document facts about risk and time preferences, 
indicating a high potential for DOSE in future research.
Session Topic: Bounded Rationality (Room 001A)
•	 Daniela Di Cagno. ‘Learning to Avoid Sub-optimality:  
Experimental Evidence of Intermediate Advice.’
Authors: Noemi Pace, Daniela Di Cagno, Werner Guth
Abstract: For portfolio tasks with a binary chance event optimal choices 
are corner solutions due to several experimental controls. Previous 
studies (Di Cagno et al., 2017 and 2018) report overwhelming evidence of 
suboptimal investments but also that with more experience participants 
learn to reduce suboptimality. For fifteen parameters constellations, used 
before and all featuring optimality as corner points of the expected utility 
curve, participants of the new experiment confront all randomly ordered 
cases in three successive phases. Advise is provided either between the first 
and the second or the second and the third phase by alerting participants 
that lowering the risky investment level can improve success in at least one 
chance event without harming the success of the other. In the more complex 
treatment participants also form state-specific success aspirations. Due 
to incentivization this allows for suboptimal satisficing. Early advice is, as 
expected, better than later one but less effective with more task complexity. 
Especially, the reduction of suboptimality in satisficing is minor.
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•	 Aljaz Ule. ‘Commitment aversion revisited.’
Authors: Arthur Schram, Aljaz Ule
Abstract: Many economic and non-economic environments involve long-
term commitment. We investigate here how decisions in these environments 
are moderated by superstition and aversion to commitment. In our 
experiment, subjects repeatedly choose between similar lotteries, with a 
unique stochastically dominant choice. Treatments vary in appointing one 
of the lotteries as a ‘commitment choice’. After choosing this commitment 
choice, subjects must choose it for the remaining periods of the experiment. 
The rate of dominant choices significantly drops when such a choice 
commits, and this is not related to superstitious decisions in the second 
part of the experiment. We show that designating a commitment option 
substantially changes subjects’ choices in a way that can only be attributed 
to an aversion to committment. 
•	 Ismael Rafai. ‘Revealed Preferences under Stochastic Attention. 
Characterization, Statistical Test and Experimental Evidence.’
Abstract: We propose a thorough test of the model of decision under 
limited attention proposed by Manzini and Mariotti (2014, Econometrica) 
and extended by Brady and Rehbeck (2016, Econometrica).  In the model, 
the decision maker chose as if she maximizes a well-defined preference 
relation over a menu-dependent stochastic consideration set. For this 
purpose, we provide a new characterization and a new revealed preference 
theorem that are more adapted to statistical testing. We develop 
appropriate statistical procedures to test the axioms, to reveal preferences 
and to measure attention. We conduct a laboratory experiment, based on 
a “selective attention task”, where participants chose one of the monetary 
rewards displayed during a short period of time and among numerous 
distractors. Our results show that most of the subjects behave in coherence 
with the model. Moreover, the revealed preferences are coherent with the 
ones induced experimentally.
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•	 Fabien Perez. ‘Self-selection into strategic environments.’
Authors: Guillaume Hollard, Fabien Perez
Abstract: Nash equilibrium is one of the most commonly used theoretical 
construct in economics and many experiments have thus been designed to 
test whether it is a good predictor of the behavior of experimental subjects. 
Experiments have routinely documented the existence of a substantial 
fraction of confused subjects who exhibit a rather erratic behavior (e.g. 
playing dominated strategies) and may thus deviate from Nash equilibrium. 
The present paper investigates the possibility that confused player may be 
aware of their own confusion and, as a result, may prefer to avoid playing 
games they do not feel comfortable with. Since in classical experiments 
subjects are not offered the possibility to self-select into specific tasks, 
the possibility that confused players may like to withdraw from certain 
games remained undetected. We argue that the consequences of self-
selection are important. First of all, if confused subjects choose not to 
participate, deviations from Nash equilibrium will be attenuated. Second, 
offering the possibility not to participate will bring experiments closer 
to field situations in which individuals are free to participate, or not, and, 
hence, enhance the external validity of lab experiments. We here design an 
experiment which includes the possibility for subjects to choose between 
a sure payoff and playing a game with the subjects who also self-selected. 
We find that confused players are indeed more likely to withdraw, leading 
to a substantial reduction of the gap between empirical observations and 
theoretical predictions. Furthermore, active players may revise their beliefs 
to take into account the new composition of the subject pool, an effect 
which may further reduce the gap between. We however find little evidence 
that active players are updating their beliefs.  Behavioral models were 
designed to account for bounded rationality in games. We then confront 
existing models (e.g. Quantal response or level-k) to our data. We find that 
in their current form, existing models have only a limited ability to account 
for the kind of behavior induced by self-selection in experimental games.
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Session Topic: Cooperation (Room 001C)
•	 Yu Gao. ‘Unequal past, shared future-Reaching agreement with 
responsibilities passed by generations.’
Authors: Valentina Bosetti, Ning Liu,  Massimo Tavoni, Yu Gao
Abstract: Mitigating global problems such as climate change requires 
collaboration across countries in spite of overwhelming asymmetries. 
Countries differ in their historical contribution to the causes of climate change 
itself, in their vulnerability to its implications, as well as in their ability to pay 
for mitigation and adaptation. These asymmetries, through the magnifying 
lens of self-serving bias, have been a major cause of negotiation impasse. 
Through an experiment, we directly measure the self-serving bias in the 
context of a collective-risk social dilemma with asymmetric players. We 
explore beliefs over the fair allocation of contributions and study  how this 
is affected by alternative narratives of historical responsibility. We find that 
subjects have broadly shared belief on the fair allocation of contributions, 
where poor and rich alike, contribute the same proportion of their 
endowment in the veil of ignorance setting. However, their contributions 
differ in the dictator game. Self-serving bias is measured by the difference 
in contributions in the setting of veil of ignorance and the dictator game. 
Overall allocations made by the rich succumb more to the self-serving 
bias than the allocations made by the poor do. The three framings of 
historical responsibility (direct responsibility, inherited responsibility and no 
responsibility) does not affect the belief of fair allocation of contributions, 
but have different impact on the self-serving bias exhibited in allocations. 
Under the framing of inherited responsibility, self-serving bias of the rich 
was eliminated, while that of the poor was amplified, which lead to a more 
equal society in terms of wealth.
•	 Jan Frederik Graff. ‘Reviewing and Predicting Cooperation in Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Games: A Meta-Study.’
Authors: Robert Böhm, Luca Carduck-Eick, Frederik Graff, Christine 
Harbring, Rebecca Tilkes
Abstract: The prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) constitutes one of the 
most intensively studied social dilemma games in social sciences. Previous 
research has used various parameterizations of the PDG, i.e., the relative 
differences between the payoffs T, R, P, and S. Although a perfectly 
selfish-rational actor should not be influenced by such differences, there 
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is compelling evidence that most people have at least some concern for 
others and should therefore be sensible to relative incentive differences. 
Accordingly, previous research proposed several indices that aim to 
capture the likelihood of players’ cooperative (vs. defective) behavior in 
different parameterizations of the PDG. These indices have in common that 
they use the relative size of the payoffs T, R, P, and S to predict players’ 
inclination to cooperate vs. defect. Yet, the indices differ in the computation 
and weighting of these parameters and, thus, come to different behavioral 
predictions. We investigate data from more than 33,000 study participants 
of 396 independent studies, reported in 147 papers between 1958 and 
2017 in order to answer two related research questions: How accurately do 
different indices predict differences in cooperation vs. defection behavior, 
and which index performs best? First analyses using weighted normalized 
payoffs suggest that there are considerable differences in the amount of 
explained cooperation variance by different indices. Simple indices like 
R/T show the highest linear correlation with the empirical cooperation 
rate. This result is confirmed by OLS regressions considering additional 
control variables (e.g., year of publication, matching procedure, one-shot 
vs. repeated play). The results indicate that indices matching the actors’ 
(heuristic) decision processes more closely are better in explaining actual 
cooperation behavior. Moreover, our findings have value for experimental 
researchers studying behavior in PDGs to make better predictions about 
expected cooperation rates in behavioral experiments using the PDG.
•	 Levent Neyse. ‘Social comparisons in the Public Goods Game.’
Authors: Pablo Brañas-Gar, Elena Molis, Levent Neyse
Abstract: Cumulative evidence in social psychology has shown that social 
comparisons have strong influences on human behavior and cognition. In 
this study, we investigate the impact of social comparisons on contribution 
decisions in the public goods game. Our design consists of four 
homogeneously formed groups which differ from each other with respect 
to their marginal per capita return (mpcr) levels. In the control treatments, 
groups were only aware of their own mpcrs where in experimental 
treatments high (low) mpcr groups were informed about the existence of 
low (high) mpcr groups. In line with the typical findings in the literature, 
contributions increase with the mpcr both with and without information. 
The results on social comparisons show that when groups with the lowest 
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mpcr were informed about the existence of groups with the highest mpcr, 
they decrease their contributions dramatically. Our findings points out 
that upward social comparisons have a significant impact on contribution 
decisions when the reference group has a much higher return level.
•	 Ning Liu. ‘Visions fly and actions follow:  
Estimation of successors’ actions enhances intergenerational altruism.’
Authors: Ning Liu, Valentina Bosetti, Francis Dennig, Massimo Tavoni, Elke U. Weber
Abstract: One of the challenges posed by the management of many 
important resources, such as a livable climate and access to safe drinking 
water, is that sustainability requires each generation to contribute 
successively to their maintenance. Each generation is both beneficiary of 
the contribution of its predecessors as well as steward for the maintenance 
of the resources for its successors. When facing such an intergenerational 
dilemma, decision makers usually exhibit intergenerational reciprocity, the 
tendency to repeat the predecessors’ action. Consequently, intergenerational 
contributions plummet when predecessors stop contributing. This paper 
identifies a simple behavioral intervention to motivate contributions by 
decision makers whose predecessors did not contribute. We show that 
eliciting the decision makers’ expectation of future generations’ generosity 
considerably increases their own rate of contribution. The decisions of 
treated decision makers are affected less by intergenerational reciprocity 
and more by fairness and efficiency considerations, while their altruism 
attitude remains unaltered. The intervention directs decision makers’ 
attention to the future and the efficiency of contributing, uncoupling the 
decision from the perceived injustice of their predecessors’ actions and 
instead increasing the salience of the impact their own decisions will have 
on the future. 
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Parallel Sessions V. (1:30 PM – 3:00 PM)
Session Topic: Political Economy (Room LH007)
Rebecca Morton. ‘Social groups, information sharing, and the 
effectiveness of public protests.’
Authors: Marco Battaglini, Eleonora Patacchini, Rebecca Morton
Abstract: In this paper we investigate the effect of information sharing in 
social groups on protest choices theoretically and experimentally. We find 
that information sharing can lead to individuals making protest decisions 
based on the experiences of the majority in their group rather than simply 
their own personal experiences. When citizens protest to refl‡ect the overall 
experience of their social groups, then their protests can be more effective 
in conveying information to policy makers, particularly those whose ex ante 
policy preferences may be signicantly different from citizens ’such that they 
are not easily persuaded. In this way,
information sharing within social groups can result in more informationally 
efficient protest choices by citizens and to more efficient public policies as 
a consequence. 
•	 Lionel Page. ‘Too big to prevail: Coalition formations in the presence of a 
superpower.’ 
Authors: Changxia Ke, Florian Morath, Anthony Newell, Lionel Page
Abstract: In this study we investigate the effect of players’ power on the 
formation of coalitions to divide a prize when the assumption that coalition 
formation involves binding agreements on how to split the prize is relaxed. 
In our experimental setup with one powerful (‘strong’) player and three 
standard (‘weak’) players, we vary the strong players voting rights in one 
dimension and manipulate the timing of agreement and communication on 
the prize division in the other dimension (i.e., whether binding agreement 
on prize division and furthermore whether non-binding communication 
on prize-split intentions at the stage of coalition formation is available). 
We predict and find: first, with binding agreement, the results of the game 
and the players average payoff are (surprisingly closely) in line with the 
relative power of the players as measured by their Shapley value. Second, 
when binding agreement on the division of the prize is not possible at the 
stage of coalition formation, the strong player’s likelihood to be part of the 
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winning coalition and his average payoff stays high if he  is not “too strong” 
but it decreases significantly if his voting rights increase further. Third, 
communication at the coalition formation stage mitigates this negative 
effect of the absence of binding agreements for powerful players.
•	 Aaron Kamm. ‘Policy capture by special interests in democracies:  
The role of revolving doors and post-office employees.’
Authors: Jens Großer, Aaron Kamm, Ernesto Reuben
Abstract: We experimentally study the role of the revolving door and 
post-office employment in policy capture by special interests. In our 
rent diversion game, two politicians compete in a majoritarian election 
by announcing binding tax policies and special interests can attempt to 
influence them through unconditional transfers after the election. We 
observe that (i) the possibility of transfers leads to some policy capture 
by the special interests; (ii) policy capture increases when special interests 
and politicians interact repeatedly via the revolving door and, to a lesser 
extent, when special interests can build a reputation of providing post-
office employment to exiting politicians who committed to low taxes while 
in office; (iii) successful policy capture only arises if proposing low tax 
rates, in particular when politicians coordinate on doing so, is sufficiently 
rewarded by the special interests to compensate for the risk of proposing 
an unpopular policy. 
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Session Topic: Nudges (Room 004)
•	 Henning Hermes. ‘Motivating Low-Achievers –  
Relative Performance Feedback in School.’
Authors: Björn Bartling, Alexander Cappelen, Henning Hermes, Marit 
Skivenes, Bertil Tungodden
Abstract: Across the globe, the use of e-learning software is a fast-
growing phenomenon, already in early educational stages. Most of these 
applications provide rankings or leader boards as motivational tools. 
However, this relative performance feedback often has negative effects on 
low-achievers. We suggest a new form of relative performance feedback 
that scores performance improvements. Using a randomized-controlled 
trial in primary schools, we show that relative performance feedback 
on performance improvements substantially increases motivation and 
performance in math for low-achieving pupils, without hurting high-
achieving pupils. This example shows that feedback in e-learning systems 
could have the potential to reduce inequalities in educational settings by 
improving motivation and learning outcomes for low-achievers.
•	 Haoran He. ‘Goal setting, effort provision and performance:  
a field experiment in college physical training courses.’
Authors: Haoran He, Ronghai Su, Qian Weng
Abstract: Goal setting may be a low-cost, scaleable and logistically 
simple commitment device to help students to self-regulate their behavior, 
and increase their effort and consequently improve their performance. 
We investigate the effects of two types of goal setting (i.e., goal set at 
absolute and relative performance) on effort provision in training and test 
performance by conducting field experiments in college physical training 
classes. We exogenously vary whether or not a goal is set and whether or 
not the goal is set based on knowing one’s ability. We find that goal setting 
has positive effect on effort provision in training and test performance. This 
positive effect varies significantly across types of goal setting and across 
types of students in terms of their ability and various individual preferences 
through the channel of setting different types of goals. Policy implications 
are discussed.
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•	 Yu Gao. ‘It’s So Hot in Here: Information Avoidance, Moral Wiggle Room,  
and High Air Conditioning Usage.’
Authors: Giovanna d’Adda, Yu Gao, Russell Golman and Massimo Tavoni
Abstract: Environmental policies based on information provision are 
widespread, but have often proven ineffective. One possible explanation for 
information’s low effectiveness is that people actively avoid it. We conduct 
an online field experiment on Mechanical Turk and a field experiment on 
households in China on air conditioning usage to test the theory of moral 
wiggle room, according to which people avoid information that would 
compel them to act morally, against the standard theory of information 
acquisition, and identify conditions under which each theory applies. 
In the experiments, we observe how exogenously imposing a feeling of 
moral obligation to reduce air conditioning usage and exploiting natural 
variation in the cost of doing so, given by outside temperature, influences 
subjects’ avoidance of information about their energy use impacts on the 
environment. Moral obligation increases information avoidance when it is 
hot outside, consistent with the moral wiggle room theory, but decreases it 
when outside temperature is low. Avoiding information positively correlates 
with air conditioning usage. These findings provide guidance about tailoring 
the use of nudges and informational tools to the decision environment.
•	 Shemal Doshi. ‘Fine as a Nudge: Experimental Evidence.’
Authors: Shemal Doshi and Abhijeet Chandra
Abstract: Fine can be a price but to what extent? More importantly, do 
fines act as nudges to provoke behavior in long run? In this study, we 
attempt to answer these questions. Based on the arguments made by 
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) who provide evidence against the deterrent 
hypothesis that suggests that a penalty that leaves everything else 
unchanged reduces the occurrence of the behavior subject to the fine. In 
this paper, we empirically examine the model suggested by Lin and Yang 
(2006) that provides a complementary explanation and qualifies but does 
not lose the predictive power of the deterrence hypothesis. Employing 
experimental approach for controlled and uncontrolled groups of graduate 
students, we explore as to what extent individuals perceive monetary 
penalty as a deterrent. We examine that the amount of fine, significance 
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of it’s with respect to the overall payoff, and the type of fine needs to 
be taken into consideration before generalizing the above hypothesis. 
Our empirical experimental evidence suggests that the subjects show a 
higher propensity to comply with the stipulated norm that “they should 
not avoid the rules” in a peer-influenced environment than when subjected 
to isolated experiments. Our results further reveal that their tendency 
to pay fine and get away with the situation is inversely related with the 
quantum of fine imposed and directly correlated with the frequency of the 
rule-breaking behavior. These results confirm the findings of Lin and Yang 
(2006) that penalty should be substantial enough to deter the individuals, 
rather than just fining them for the sake of penalty. Finally, we argue that 
the theory of “fine is a price” doesn’t just apply to a single kind of event or 
model. It can be observed that such trends are also followed up in many 
another set up too. In case of a multi-step game, we observed that people 
often tend to go for paying up a penalty if they are going to get the better 
payoff after subsequent events.
Session Topic: Morals (Room 005)
•	 Xiangdong Qin. ‘Two-Stage moral behaviors:  
some evidence from lab experiment.’
Authors: Kun Qian and Xiangdong Qin
Abstract: Moral behavior is an integral part of economic interactions. We 
conducted a series of lab experiments studying intertemporal choices that 
conform to different paths of moral regularities. Our experimental findings 
indicate that “moral consistency” dominates “moral balancing”, and that 
“moral licensing”, rather than “moral cleansing”, plays a more prominent 
role in intertemporal moral decision making. Moreover, “moral licensing” 
is evident in both immediate and delayed sequence of moral choices, but 
“moral cleansing” is only observed in the immediate sequence of moral 
behavior treatment. Our experimental results have provided new empirical 
evidence to the discussion about moral choices over time.
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•	 Björn Bartling. ‘Do Markets Undermine Morals?.’
Authors: Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr, Yagiz Özdemir
Abstract: Some recent experimental papers claim that markets erode 
moral values. In this paper, we study potential causes for the deterioration 
of moral behavior in markets. We show that inherent features of market 
institutions, modeled as a double auction, do not cause the erosion of moral 
behavior relative to decisions made in a non-market environment, modeled 
as a choice list. Rather, previously reported differences in moral behavior 
between these two institutional settings stem from an experimental 
confound: repeated play in the market context was compared to one-shot 
play in the non-market context. Second, we show that moral behavior 
remains robust even in very competitive market environments, where 
market participants cannot enforce moral market outcomes by refraining 
from immoral market transactions. Finally, we study the role of social 
information in market and non-market environments. 
•	 Wladislaw Mill. ‘The Normative Perception of Power Abuse.’
Authors: David Rojo Arjona, Daniel E. Fragiadakis and Ada Kovaliukaite
Abstract: Theories of non-equilibrium strategic thinking (e.g. Level-k and 
Cognitive Hierarchy) intend to describe how individuals actually behave. But 
how much of their descriptive accuracy is driven by being more permissive 
theories? We modify Selten [1991] axiomatic measure of predictive success 
to ensure individual consistency. By applying restrictions over observables 
to the individual data (echoing the revealed preference literature), we test 
the necessary and suffcient conditions of these theories and quantify the 
economic losses for deviations from the theory. The non-parametric results 
are favourable for these theories and show that their predictive success is 
not mechanically due to their permissiveness.
•	 Vera te Velde. ‘Is moral thinking marginal thinking?.’
Authors: Vera te Velde, Winnifred Louis
Abstract: Descriptive norms, which measure the prevalence of moral 
behavior (“cooperation”) in a population, and injunctive norms, which 
measure beliefs about the moral imperative to cooperate, are known to 
be powerful motivators of cooperation. Understanding the channels of 
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these effects is complicated by the fact that injunctive and descriptive 
norms are tightly related: descriptive norms provide information about 
others’ injunctive beliefs, about the costs and benefits of cooperation, and 
about the likelihood of sanction. Injunctive beliefs, in turn, are affected 
by the costs and benefits of cooperation and affect sanctioning behavior. 
We study the psychological underpinnings of normative influence by 
exogenously changing the relationship between descriptive and injunctive 
norms. By comparing behavior in games in which higher descriptive norms 
translate into either higher, lower, or constant marginal social benefit from 
cooperation (while private costs remain constant) and in which descriptive 
expectations are exogenously determined to be either high or low, we find 
that descriptive norms powerfully influence behavior independently of their 
informational content. This occurs despite the fact that injunctive beliefs 
are indeed determined more by the costs and benefits involved than the 
descriptive norms. This reveals a preference for moral conformity that is 
divorced from the material marginal costs and benefits to cooperation, 
either private or social.
Session Topic: Peer Punishment (Room 006)
•	 David Kingsley. ‘Peer punishment,  
income inequality and incomplete information.’
Authors: Lawrence De Geest, David Kingsley
Abstract: We examine the long-run benefits of peer punishment in public 
goods games with endowment inequality and incomplete information. 
Previous work has found that while peer punishment can boost cooperation 
in the short-run, welfare improvements only come in the long-run. However, 
endowment inequality requires agreement on contribution norms that 
reflect differences in wealth, and coordination can suffer if individuals 
exploit private information about their endowments. We conduct 50 period 
public goods games with peer punishment. Subjects are placed in groups 
of four and randomly assigned high or low endowments. Treatments vary 
whether information about group member endowments is private or public. 
Preliminary results suggest that groups successfully use peer punishment 
to enforce beneficial contribution norms when endowments are observed. 
However, when endowments are unobserved, beneficial norms do not 
emerge. Data collection is on-going. 
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•	 Agnalys Michaud. ‘Effectiveness of peer punishment under negative framing.’
Authors: Kate Farrow, David Masclet, Agnalys Michaud, Marc Willinger
Abstract: Given robust evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of peer 
sanctioning mechanisms in inciting cooperation in positively-framed public 
good games, we investigate whether peer sanctioning is equally effective 
in a negatively-framed public good game. We rely on Andreoni’s (1995) 
experimental design and introduce monetary sanctions in the negative and 
positive frames. In the absence of peer-punishment we replicate previous 
findings about the framing effect, i.e. lower group contributions under 
negative than under positive framing. When peer punishment is feasible, 
nearly full group cooperation is observed under positive framing. Under 
negative framing however, average group contributions remain stable 
around 45%. Slightly more punishment points are inflicted under negative 
framing. However, we do not observe differences in sanctioning motives 
between frames: the same determinants of the sanctioning decisions 
are observed in both frames (negative deviation, positive deviation). We 
suggest that the lower cooperation observed under negative framing 
despite the availability of punishment is due to a lower effectiveness of 
received punishment points than under positive framing.
•	 Andreas Nicklisch. ‘War experience, religiosity, and  
punishment schemes: Field evidence from Syria.’
Authors: Elisa Fraile Aranda, Andreas Nicklisch, Lamis Saleh , Stefan Voigt
Abstract: The civil war in Syria has been raging since 2011. It is generally 
considered as one of the most violent battles in the 21st century; a 
countless number of civilians have suffered violence or witnessed war 
related experiences. There is a substantial fear that this horrible experience 
influences important values and habits of Syrians, particularly subjects’ 
degree of religiosity and their acceptance of violence. To analyze this 
issue, we run a series of online experiments among Syrians in Syria, some 
from regions affect by civil war, some not affected. We analyze their 
war experience and their current level of psychological distress. Further, 
we approximate their degree of religiosity by means of a questionnaire, 
while eliciting their use of punishment in a modified ultimatum game. 
This game allows us to estimate their response in terms of punishment 
to different degrees of norm violation. We relate individual differences in 
the severeness of punishment and changes in the level of religiosity with 
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war experience and their current level of psychological distress. Finally, we 
discuss the implications of our findings for the future development of the 
Syrian society.
Session Topic: Beliefs (Room 009)
•	 Matej Lorko. ‘Historical information and project duration estimates.’
Authors: Matej Lorko,  Maroš Servátka, Le Zhang
Abstract: The ability to accurately estimate the duration of future activities 
is the cornerstone of successful project management practice. Accurate 
project estimates reduce not only the risk of schedule and cost overruns, 
but also the possible underutilization of company resources. Traditionally, 
thorough project specification has been perceived as a crucial determinant 
of accurate project duration estimates. However, even the most extensive 
description cannot capture every detail of the proposed project activities, 
especially at the early project stages, when the exact scope is often unclear. 
Thus, project planners focus on provided information, often neglecting 
that it might be incomplete. As a result, project duration estimates may 
become understated. We conjecture that accuracy of project schedules 
can be improved by consulting historical information regarding the same 
or similar projects. We experimentally test our conjectures in a real effort 
task. Subjects first estimate the time it will take them to complete the task, 
indicate their subjective confidence with the estimate and then perform 
it. We manipulate the description of the task and whether and when 
subjects receive the historical information. We examine the relationship 
between the detail of the task description, estimation accuracy, subjective 
confidence in estimates and the effect of historical information on former 
beliefs regarding the task duration. We find that although very detailed 
task description eliminates the typical underestimation of the task duration, 
it also induces large variance in individual estimates, which impairs the 
overall estimation accuracy. On the other hand, the provision of historical 
information significantly improves the estimation accuracy. This effect is 
independent on the timing of information provision. Finally, we find that 
subjective confidence in estimates is not a function of quality or the 
quantity of available information, supporting the conjecture that people 
often do not account for the possibility that they miss critical evidence for 
their judgment.
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•	 Ritwik Banerjee. ‘Self-confidence spillovers and motivated beliefs.’
Authors: Nabanita Datta Gupta, Marie Claire Villeval
Abstract: Is success in a task used strategically by individuals to motivate 
their beliefs prior to taking action in a subsequent, unrelated, task? Also, is 
the distortion of beliefs reinforced for individuals who have lower status in 
society? Conducting an artefactual field experiment in India, we show that 
success when competing in a task increases the performers’ self-confidence 
and competitiveness in the subsequent task. We also find that such spillovers 
affect the self-confidence of low-status individuals more than that of high-
status individuals. Receiving good news under Affirmative Action, however, 
boosts confidence across tasks regardless of the caste status.
•	 Zeeshan Samad. ‘Self-deception.’
Abstract: This paper studies self-deception. Individuals have expectations 
of themselves that are inconsistent with their true preferences but they deceive 
themselves into thinking that these two are consistent. This paper presents 
a model of self deception that generates hypotheses regarding individual 
behavior. This paper also presents an experiment design that decomposes 
the effect of true preferences and of expectations that individuals have of 
themselves on sending money in dictator games. The primary hypothesis 
that the experiment tests is that dictators often send money because they 
expect themselves to be altruistic, not because they truly are altruistic. 
•	 Jan Zilinsky. ‘Learning about income inequality changes views but  
does not mobilize voters.’
Abstract: This paper studies whether limited information about inequality 
accounts for the anti-tax preferences of American voters. Unlike standard 
surveys, this experiment examines preferences for taxation while controlling 
for perceived economic opportunity, beliefs about how the economy 
works, and views about the sources of inequality. Random assignment to 
information exposure about income inequality is used to identify a causal 
relationship between awareness about income inequality and the perceived 
fairness of the economy. The first effect of information is an increase in 
pessimism about economic opportunity. However, subjects who are 
exposed to information are not more willing to take specific action (support 
higher taxes) compared to the uninformed control group.
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Session Topic: Industrial Organization (Room 001A)
•	 Silvester Van Koten. ‘Self-regulation and meta-regulation – regulating 
the members or the SRO? A theoretical and experimental.’
Abstract: Regulatory investigations by Self-Regulatory organizations 
(SROs) have been recognized to usually be cheaper than investigations 
by the government. However, in practice, oversight by an SRO is mostly 
still supplied with forms of governmental oversight. The government may 
exert oversight over the SRO itself, a construction referred to as “meta-
regulation” or “co-regulation”, or over the members of the SRO. Indeed, 
the overall performance of SROs has been mixed and theoretical models 
show that SROs have incentives to set lax standards or cover up detected 
violations. However, some research indicate that meta-regulation, oversight 
of the SRO itself, may nonetheless not be necessary in some settings. 
Using a costly-state-verification model, DeMarzo et al. (2001; 2005) show 
that when the government implicitly threatens to perform additional 
investigations of the SROs members, a relatively “good” outcome can be 
established as an equilibrium. In this “good” outcome, the SRO chooses to 
follow high performance standards in order to pre-empt any of the (relatively 
costly) governmental investigations. As a result, no costly governmental 
investigations of the SRO’s members take place, and no meta-regulation of 
the SRO is necessary.
I extend this model to include plausible settings where the actual rigor 
of oversight by the SRO can be verified only ex-post. I show that in such 
settings, the SRO may have incentives to announce stricter regimes than 
it effectively implements and that, as a result, a “bad”, Pareto-inefficient 
outcome is established as an equilibrium. In the “bad” outcome, the SRO 
relinquishes all oversight to the government. The predictions of this model 
are supported by experimental tests. The “good” equilibrium can be re-
established as an equilibrium with sufficient meta-regulation of the SRO. 
The results thus indicate a continuing need for meta-regulation in these 
settings. This form of meta-regulation may be of a relatively light-handed 
nature, limited to verifying and sanctifying that the SRO implements its 
announced policies.
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•	 Siqi Pan. ‘Do Exploding Offers Really Explode?  
The Role of Commitment in Search Deterrence.’
Authors: Siqi Pan, Xin Zhao
Abstract: Exploding offers are frequently used in labor markets and 
consumer goods markets to discourage search. The implementation of 
such strategies requires that the proposer have the power to commit, 
which is often not the case in real-world markets. In a lab experiment, we 
investigate the role of commitment power in the proposer’s use and the 
receiver’s response of exploding offers. We also compare strategies that 
deter search on the time dimension (exploding offers) and those focus on 
the monetary dimension (price/wage discrimination).
•	 Jason Shachat. ‘Group identity and implicit collusion in Cournot 
competition: Theory and experiments.’
Authors: Jinrui Pan, Jason Shachat, Qinjuan Wan
Abstract: We evaluate the impact of group identity on implicit collusion 
in Cornout competition with one-shot, finitely repeated and indefinitely 
repeated interactions. We develop game theoretic predictions assuming 
group identity impacts decision makers’ social preferences. One-shot 
predictions are intuitive; in-group identity leads to more collusion than out-
group identity. Under repeated interactions predictions are counterintuitive. 
Out-group identity leads to greater incidence and longer sustained 
collusion. We test these predictions in a series of laboratory experiments 
with induced group identity. We find economically insignificant differences 
in one-shot interactions. In repeated interactions we find in-group identity 
leads to significantly more collusion. This feature grows within and across 
super games. We find this behavior is driven by in-group duopolies’ greater 
use of negative and positive reciprocal norms. Group identity affects 
implicit collusion by modifying access to behavioral norms incongruent 
with the best response motivations of Nash equilibrium, not through the 
shaping of social preferences.
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•	 Xiaoyuan Wang. ‘The effect of information disclosure on an 
experimental hold-up game.’
Authors: Kaiming Zheng, Debin Ni, Yang Yang
Abstract: Many relation-specific investments are associated with great risk, 
because investors may need to bargain with investees over the potential 
return and the bargaining result depends heavily on investees’ preferences 
and subsequent choices. Information on investees’ preferences plays a key 
role in improving investment decisions. We provide investors with their 
partners’ previous performance in two sub-games of an experimental hold-
up game: in one treatment, each investor observes her partner’s previous 
choice in the bargaining stage and in another, each investor observes 
the investment stage. Using a lab experiment, we find investors use the 
information to improve their investment decisions and such information 
reduces investors over-investment mistakes. However, there still exists 
significant mistakes. We discuss the potential source of the mistakes and 
conclude that similar behavior in different economic settings can have very 
different impacts on players’ interpretation and expectations of players’ 
behavior.
Parallel Sessions VI. (3:30 PM – 5:00 PM)
Session Topic: Industrial Organization (Room LH007)
•	 Karim Sadrieh. ‘Short-term versus long-term contracting:  
Empirical assessment of the ratchet effect in supply chain.’
Authors: Lennart Johnsen, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, Guido Voigt
Abstract: In laboratory experiments, we compare the performance of 
short-term and long-term contracts in a two-period supplier-buyer dyad 
with asymmetric cost information. Our results support the game theoretical 
prediction that the supplier should strictly prefer long-term over short-term 
contracts. In contradiction to theory, the supply chains in our experiments 
do not benefit from a series of short-term contracts in comparison to a 
long-term contract. Short-term contracting evokes (a) higher rates of 
contract rejections, (b) the “ratchet effect”, that is, the buyer is reluctant 
to reveal her private information early on because she expects increasingly 
disadvantageous contract offers as the supplier improves his information 
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about her type, and (c) some suppliers fail to adapt their contract selection 
to the information they can extract from the buyer’s previous contract choice. 
•	 Francisco Gomez Martinez. ‘Partial Cartels and Mergers with 
Heterogeneous Firms: Experimental Evidence.’
Abstract: A usual assumption in the theory of collusion is that cartels 
are all-inclusive. In contrast, most real-world collusive agreements do not 
include all firms that are active in the relevant industry. This paper studies 
both theoretically and experimentally the formation and behavior of partial 
cartels. The theoretical model is a variation of Bos and Harrington’s (2010) 
model where firms are heterogeneous in terms of production capacities 
and individual cartel decisions are endogenized. The experimental study 
has two main objectives. The first goal is examine whether partial cartels 
emerge in the lab at all, and if so, which firms are part of it. The second 
aim of the experiment is to study the coordinated effects of a merger 
when partial cartels are likely to operate. The experimental results can be 
summarized as follows. We find that cartels are typically not all-inclusive 
and that various types of partial cartels emerge. We observe that market 
prices decrease by 20% on average after a merger. Our findings suggest 
that merger analysis that is based on the assumption that only full cartels 
forms produces misleading results. Our analysis also illustrates how merger 
simulations in the lab can be seen as a useful tool for competition authorities 
to back up merger decisions.
•	 Jana Peliova. ‘Experimenting with Price Gouging  
and Newsvendor problem.’
Authors: Zuzana Brokesova, Cary Deck, Jana Peliova
Abstract: In the newsvendor problem, a seller must decide how much 
inventory to hold prior to the quantity demanded being realized when the 
price is fixed.  We introduce the game similar to the newsvendor problem, but 
translated into the price dimension.  This game represents a price gouging 
game.  In daily reality, this phenomenon could be observed regularly after 
a natural disaster even thought that price gouging is prohibited by the law 
and usually a subject of high fines. 
To explore Price Gouging, we conducted a series of controlled laboratory 
experiments using a 2 &times; 2 design, where we tested the difference in 
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the behavior within the Price gouging and Newsvendor game under the 
low and high costs.  Laboratory experiments were run at the University of 
Alabama where 104 experimental subjects made 5 200 decisions regarding 
the price or quantity in total. Our preliminary results support pull-to-center 
effect in Price Gouging similar to the effect observed in the Newsvendor 
game.  We do not observe the difference in choices based on the type 
of the game but we observe the difference based on the costs.  We also 
identified that the CRT score affected the consistency, where higher score 
reduced the price/quantity switching in both games and these decision 
were the same across different phases of decision making.
Session Topic: Lying (Room 004)
•	 Nick Feltovich. ‘What kind of communication is best?  
Cheap talk with two senders and one receiver.’
Authors: Nejat Anbarci, Nick Feltovich, Mehmet Y. Gurdal
Abstract: We investigate communication and decision making in a setting 
with two senders and one receiver. Each sender knows both senders’ 
quality, while the receiver is completely uninformed. After a round of 
communication, the receiver chooses to match with one of the senders. The 
receiver prefers to match with the higher-quality sender, while each sender 
simply prefers to be matched. We vary the form of communication. In our 
Byte treatment, a sender sends a single number, indicating her quality. In 
our Rich treatment, a sender sends a single free-form text message. In our 
Chat treatment, the receiver can chat with each sender individually, in two 
simultaneous two-way conversations. Our main result is that in the Chat 
treatment, receivers perform substantially better than chance in picking 
the higher-quality sender, while in the Byte and Rich treatments, receivers 
fare no better than chance. This difference seems to be due to receivers 
being able to extract more truthful and more precise information in the 
Chat treatment compared to the other two treatments.
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•	 Manuel Munoz. ‘Web of Lies: Preventing the Spread of False Information 
in Networks through Verification.’
Authors: Manuel Munoz, Kinga Makovi
Abstract: The spread of false information (e.g.  fake news, gossip, secrets) 
in social media has caught a great deal of attention by both academic 
research and popular news. Importantly, it has been shown that most people 
do not share misinformation to hurt  others  but  to  gain  personal benefits  
that reinforce  their  wellbeing,  status  or  political  beliefs.   In  other  
words,  misinformation  has  a  self-perpetuating nature, which sparked 
interest in identifying measures that reduce its dissemination. The dominant 
measures proposed are linked to the use of verification.  The underlying 
assumption is that if information is easy to identify as false, most individuals 
will not disseminate it. We test this assumption through a controlled 
online experiment. We vary how individuals verify the truthfulness of the 
information they receive in three conditions: no verification, exogenous 
verification (individuals are forced verify) and endogenous (individuals can 
choose to verify or not). We also vary the length of the communication 
network in two conditions: short (2-players) and long (3-players). While 
the verification variations allows players to identify whether a lie is being 
transmitted or not, length variations allow players in shorter networks to 
identify who the liar is. This two variations are representative of lying costs 
(whether to know one is lying or not) and reputational costs (whether others 
know one is lying or not), which have been observed to significantly explain 
lying behavior in experiments. Our results show the conditions under which 
verification is effective in preventing the spread of lies in social networks.
•	 Frederic Schneider. ‘The Persistent Power of Promises.’
Authors: Florian Ederer, Frederic Schneider
Abstract: This paper investigates how the passage of time affects trust, 
trustworthiness, and cooperation. We use a hybrid lab and online experiment 
to provide the first evidence for the persistent power of communication. Even 
when 3 weeks pass between messages and actual choices, communication 
raises cooperation, trust, and trustworthiness by about 50 percent. Lags 
between the beginning of the interaction and the time to respond do not 
substantially alter the trustworthiness of the responder. Our results further 
suggest that the findings of the large experimental literature on trust that 
focuses on laboratory scenarios, in which senders are forced to choose their 
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actions immediately after communicating with recipients, may translate to 
more ecologically valid settings in which individuals choose actions outside 
the lab and long after they initially made promises.
•	 Francesca Marazzi. ‘Telling the Other What One Knows?  
Strategic Lying in a Modified Acquiring-a-Company Experiment with.’
Author: Andrej Angelovski, Daniela Di Cagno, Werner Guth,  
Francesca Marazzi
Abstract: Lying for strategic advantage is analyzed via a modified 
Acquiring-a-Company game
(Samuelson and Bazerman, 1985) where both buyers and sellers have private 
information about the parameters affecting their payoffs. Their different 
evaluations of the company are linearly linked via an undervaluation 
coefficient for the seller, about which only the buyers are informed, while 
only the seller is aware of its actual value. Before bargaining, we allow 
both parties to reveal what they know via cheap-talk numerical messages. 
Will such mutual message exchange be reliable and enhance trade? 
Will misreporting prevail and be role and gender dependent? Strategic 
misreporting for sellers is higher throughout the experiment. Regarding 
gender, women misreport less, especially as sellers, and offer higher prices 
as buyers.
Session Topic: Asset Markets (Room 005)
•	 Lijia Wei. ‘Supply Fluctuations and Bubbles of Real Assets:  
A Experimental Study.’
Abstract: This paper explores the bubble problem of real assets using 
experimental economics. In the experimental setting of this paper, 
participants need to repeat the purchase of real assets and make production 
decisions. The basic value of real assets remains unchanged during the 
experiment. Our innovations to previous literature are: (1) constructing the 
setting of constant or tight asset supply (2) constructing the setting of the 
basic value of the asset (2) the real assets constructed in the experimental 
design are different from the financial assets. Attributes.
We find that when the supply of real assets is constant, the price will 
generate a bubble, but the bubble will soon burst; when the supply of 
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real assets is gradually reduced, the participants cannot rationally use the 
intertemporal smoothing, and the asset price is slow. Rise to a skyrocketing 
phenomenon. Based on the expected data of participants’ price collection 
in the experiment, this paper finds that the difference between expected 
and actual prices drives the rise and fall of asset prices. The paper also finds 
that if the participants are allowed to borrow the real assets over time, it will 
help to stabilize the price bubble of the assets.
•	 Nilanjan Roy. ‘Achieving Pareto optimality even though prices are “wrong”.’
Authors: Edward Halim, Yohanes E. Riyanto, Nilanjan Roy
Abstract: We design an infinite horizon dynamic asset market experiment 
with perishable consumption and a long-lived asset where the gains from 
trade originate from individuals experiencing income shocks. The presence 
of traders having induced motive to smooth consumption is not sufficient 
to eliminate price bubbles. Despite the asset being consistently priced 
higher than the risk-neutral fundamental value, trades improve welfare with 
investors moving closer to Pareto optimal allocations. The co-existence of 
traders with income shocks along with those having no induced motive to 
trade does not hinder in the former smoothing their consumption stream. 
Our results hold for markets with and without aggregate risk.
•	 Adriana Breaban. ‘Animal Spirits, Greater Fools, or Safety First:  
How do optimism, cognitive reflection, and risk aversion.’
Authors: Adriana Breaban, Mark Schneider 
Abstract: We experimentally investigate three factors that may influence 
trading strategies and performance during stock market bubbles: Cognitive 
reflection, risk aversion, and optimism. Subjects view real time series data 
of price changes in two markets - one from the dot-com bubble of the 
early 2000’s and the second from the more recent housing bubble that 
unfold over 15 trading periods each. In each period, subjects can allocate 
their wealth between a risk-free asset yielding a constant return and 
shares of a stock whose return distribution is ambiguous.  We find that our 
three factors of interest are uncorrelated with each other, and that they 
identify multiple sources of heterogeneity in trading behavior. In particular, 
subjects with lower cognitive reflection scores are more likely to increase 
their leverage in the market after periods of price decreases, a behavior 
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consistent with holding onto losses. More risk-averse subjects divest more 
from the market than less risk-averse subjects in the last trading periods 
while more optimistic subjects divest less from the market than pessimistic 
subjects during the last trading periods. More optimistic subjects earn 
less than pessimistic subjects while more risk-averse subjects and high 
cognitive reflection subjects earn more than less-risk averse and low 
cognitive reflection subjects. Our findings suggest that cognitive reflection 
and risk aversion are traits which help ‘insure’ investors against large losses 
from stock market crashes while optimism makes traders prone to large 
losses when the bubble ‘bursts’.
•	 Christina Rott. ‘Preference for Housing Services and the Magnitude of 
Housing Bubbles: Evidence from a Macro-Experiment’
Authors: Stefanie J. Huber, Giovanni Giusti
Abstract: Understanding the conditions under which large house 
price bubbles occur is fundamental. We shed new light on this issue 
in a laboratory setting. We find that endowing subjects with a weaker 
preference for housing services - relative to other consumption goods - 
creates larger experimental house price bubbles. This is in line with the 
theoretical model mechanism proposed by Huber (2017). The experimental 
result also speaks to the empirical cross-country regularity found in Huber 
(2017): countries that spend a lower share of total consumption on housing 
services, experienced significantly larger house price bubbles during 1970-
2014. This paper also contributes to the literature on experimental asset 
markets more generally. The paper provides a novel experimental design 
where both a market for the traded asset and a market for the dividend 
of that traded asset exists simultaneously. In addition, this paper provides 
novel design features for bringing OLG models to the laboratory.
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Session Topic: Games (Room 006)
•	 John Wooders. ‘Nash at Wimbledon: Evidence from Half a Million Serves.’
Authors: Romain Gauriot, Lionel Page, John Wooders
Abstract: Minimax and its generalization to mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium is the cornerstone of our understanding of strategic situations 
that require decision makers to be unpredictable. Using a dataset of nearly 
half a million serves from over 3000 matches, we examine whether the 
behavior of professional ten- nis players is consistent with the Minimax 
Hypothesis. The large number of matches in our dataset requires the 
development of a novel statistical test, which we show is more powerful 
than the tests used in prior related studies. We &Ouml;nd that win rates 
conform remarkably closely to the theory for men, but conform somewhat 
less neatly for women. We show that the behavior in the &Ouml;eld of more 
highly ranked (i.e., better) players conforms more closely to theory.
•	 James Fisher. ‘Interacting Cascades Experiment: Informational Spillovers.’
Authors: John Wooders
Abstract: We experimentally test whether information spills over between 
separate groups using the Interacting Cascade of Fisher and Wooders 
(2017). We find that spillovers occur and about are half as intense as 
predicted in theory.  This work is the first (to the best of our knowledge) to 
experimentally examine and test the presence and magnitude of between-
group information spillovers.
•	 Javier Perote. ‘Endogenous vs. Exogenous Leadership in teamwork:  
An experimental study.’
Authors: Carlos E. Jijena, Javier Perote and José David Vicente-Lorente
Abstract: This paper presents the results on laboratory experiments 
designed for studying the effectiveness of leadership as a way to improve 
efficiency in team production. In a three-player minimum effort game 
framework, we compare efficiency level of outcomes from three treatments: 
(1) when the leader’s position was auctioned among team members, 
namely, `endogenous leadership’; (2) when the leader is chosen randomly, 
namely ` exogenous leadership’; and (3) when there is no leader, considered 
as `control’ treatment. We found that the existence of a leader that 
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sends messages about her recommended contribution to the remaining 
members of the team, leads to significant higher contributions. We also 
confirm that the nature of leadership entails significant differences in the 
dynamics of contributions despite their similarity in the final outcomes. 
While endogenous (auctioned) leadership experiments support the role 
of leadership as an effective mechanism to achieve efficiency in team 
production, the effects of exogenous leadership seem to be conditioned by 
`negative learning’ and `order’ effects that make members to reduce their 
contributions over time.
•	 Jonas Fooken. ‘Gift exchange when gifts are taxed.’
Authors: Johannes Becker, Jonas Fooken
Abstract: The importance of exchange in the labour market when 
employers and workers interact has been widely documented in the 
literature. We study what happens to the level of gift exchange when the 
gift is taxes, which commonly occurs in real labour markets, testing for 
differential effects of who has to pay the tax. Results show that taxing the 
reciprocator leads to lower return gifts, while taxing the first mover has 
very little effect. These findings inform policy making in the real world and 
provide indications which models of pro-social decisions, which are often 
used to conceptualise reciprocity, are more suited to explain behaviour 
when taxes are introduced. 
Session Topic: Communication (Room 009)
•	 Pablo Hernandez-Lagos. ‘Cooperative Initiative through Pre-Play 
Communication in One-Shot Games.’
Abstract: I consider two games, a stag-hunt and a prisoners’ dilemma. Each 
game features non-binding, costless, and free-form pre-play communication. 
I focus on players who verbally first suggest cooperation in each game. 
I study experimentally whether the frequency of verbal initiative-taking 
for cooperation varies across games and whether initiative-taking induces 
cooperation in each game. In the stag-hunt, I find that initiative-taking is 
ubiquitous and initiators cooperate more often than non-initiators. In the 
prisoners’ dilemma, initiative-taking is less frequent relative to the stag-
hunt and initiators cooperate remarkably more often than non-initiators. 
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In this case, initiators who cooperate are also more altruistic, averse to 
lying, and believe others are likely to cooperate compared to initiators who 
defect. Initiating a suggestion to cooperate signals propensity to cooperate 
even when monetary incentives encourage defection. Moreover, optimistic 
and intrinsically motivated initiators are essential in attaining mutual 
cooperation when the best response is to defect from it.
•	 Yang Yang. ‘On Language and Meaning: A Randomized Experiment.’
Authors: Daniel Houser, Yang Yang
Abstract: We develop a method for random assignment of language 
to participants in a laboratory experiment. We use this approach to test 
the linguistic relativity hypothesis (also referred to as the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis). Linguistic relativity suggests that the structure of one’s 
language can influence one’s perceptions, interpretations and beliefs about 
the world around them. Although provocative, empirical evidence on this 
hypothesis has been elusive. A reason is that previous empirical studies 
typically rely on naturally occurring languages whose speakers differ in 
ways that correlate with language differences. Here we hypothesize that 
linguistic relativity can emerge when the same object resides in different 
semantic categories across different languages. To test this, we develop 
a novel extension of laboratory games within which languages emerge 
endogenously. We show, first, that one can control the semantic categories 
of the emergent language by varying the game’s incentives. This enables 
random assignment of language. Advantaged by this randomization, our 
experiment finds support for the hypothesis that the same object’s meaning 
can vary according to its semantic category. Our methodological and 
substantive insights promise to be important in improving communication, 
cooperation and understanding across human societies.
•	 Marianne Stephanides. ‘Helping and communication.’
Abstract: Helping behavior may be affected by the possibility to exchange 
messages such as apologies, either as substitutes or as complements. We 
conduct a laboratory experiment that explores this issue in a stochastic 
game in which one agent may help to reduce the likelihood of a negative 
event affecting a second agent, who can in turn reward or punish the first 
agent after realization of the outcome. In this context, we examine the 
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strategic effect of allowing the first agent to send a one-side messages (e.g. 
‘I am sorry’, ‘you are welcome’) to the second agent, after the outcome has 
realized, on helping, reward, and punishment behavior. Our two-factorial 
design varies whether a message can be sent, and whether the second 
agent is only informed about the outcome of the random move or also 
about the likelihood-affecting action of the first agent. We find that the 
information setting plays an important role. People help less often if they 
are allowed to send a message after the helping decision in a setting with 
perfect information about the first agent’s choice. However, allowing to send 
messages shows no positive effect on the second agent’s reward decision, 
when the first agent’s helping action is revealed. When the information 
about helping is not revealed, messages have a positive effect on reward, 
but people do not help less. 
•	 Lu Dong. ‘Talking Behind Your Back: Asymmetric Communication in a 
Three-person Dilemma.’
Authors: Klaus Abbink, Lu Dong, Lingbo Huang
Abstract: Communication has been regarded as one of the most effective 
devices in promoting team cooperation. But asymmetric communication 
sometimes breeds collusion and is detrimental to team efficiency. Here, 
we present experimental evidence showing that excluding one member 
from team communication hurts team cooperation: the communicating 
partners collude in profit allocation against the excluded team member, 
and the latter reacts by refraining from exerting effort. We further show 
that allowing the partners to reach out to the excluded member helps 
restore cooperation and fairness in profit allocation. But it does not stop the 
partners from talking behind the other member. They sometimes game the 
system by tricking the excluded member to contribute but then grabbing 
all profits for themselves.
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Session Topic: Field Experiments (Room 001A)
•	 Mirco Tonin. ‘Pay-What-You-Want to support independent information -  
A field experiment on motivation.’
Authors: Alessandra Casarico, Mirco Tonin
Abstract: Pay-what-you-want schemes can be a useful tool to finance 
high quality and independent news media without restricting readership, 
therefore guaranteeing maximum diffusion. We conduct a field experiment 
with the Italian information site lavoce.info to explore how to structure 
a campaign in a way that maximises readers’ willingness to contribute. 
We compare messages stressing two possible motivations to contribute, 
namely the public good component of the news or image motivation. 
We also test the effect of including information about the tax allowance 
associated with donations. While the particular motivation stressed does 
not have a significant impact, information about tax allowances surprisingly 
reduces overall donations, due to a reduction in the number of (small) 
donors. Stable unsubscriptions from the newsletter suggest that the 
campaign does not have an adverse effect on readers
•	 Maria Recalde. ‘Leadership and risk-taking:  
A field experiment on the mechanisms underlying social influence.’
Authors: Kate Ambler, Susan Godlonton, Maria Recalde
Abstract: We conduct an artefactual field experiment with 121 social 
groups in rural Malawi to investigate peer effects in risk-taking and 
the mechanisms underlying social influence. Treatments vary whether 
individuals observe the behavior of a formally elected group leader, an 
external leader, or a randomly selected peer. Within each treatment we also 
vary the structure of the underlying risk and whether the choice observed 
by individuals is realized (Bursztyn et al. 2014). Results show that that peers 
are the most influential agents in our sample, followed by elected leaders 
and external leaders. Different mechanisms underlie the influence of these 
agents. Individuals follow their peers because they learn from their actions, 
while they follow external and elected leaders because they derive other 
forms of social utility from following their example. Our paper contributes 
to the literature by distinguishing the mechanisms by which different 
members of a social group influence others. From a policy perspective, 
our study suggests that information about peer interest and intentions 
can be leveraged to encourage social learning and information diffusion in 
environments where significant barriers for behavior change exist.
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•	 Fernanda Leite Lopez de Leon. ‘Prejudice in the Age of Brexit:  
A Field-Experiment.’
Authors: Markus Bindemann and Fernanda Leite Lopez de Leon 
Abstract: The 2016 EU referendum results, and the Brexit vote, were 
perceived as a statement against immigration. We conducted a field-
experiment in Britain to test this perception and to investigate whether 
the Brexit vote had triggered negative attitudes and anti-social behaviour 
towards immigrants. Our (non-deceptive) experimental intervention shifted 
individuals’ perceptions about the local support for Brexit in the UK. We 
do not find evidence that the perception of a larger support for Brexit led 
to a demand for tighter immigration policies. However, in a dictator game, 
individuals gave less to Europeans and became more likely to express 
negative views about them. Overall, our results indicate modest impacts 
of the Brexit vote, but they point to the effect of information revealed in 
election outcomes in changing citizens’ attitudes.
•	 John Gibson. ‘Quality, Quantity, and Price:  
Experimental Evidence on Taxing Soft Drinks.’
Authors: John Gibson and Steven Tucker
Abstract: We conducted laboratory experiments in New Zealand to 
study how consumers adjust the quality of soft drinks demanded as prices 
change. We introduce two key features seen in the field: a distribution of 
prices across space because of transport costs, which alters the relative 
price of quality; and, consumer responses to price changes that occur on 
both the quality margin and the quantity margin. Most of the estimates of 
the price elasticity of quantity demand from observational data that are 
used to advocate for taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages ignore these two 
features. Consequently, these studies have overstated the likely reduction 
in the quantity of sugary drinks that would be consumed if health-related 
taxes are introduced for these drinks.
Our laboratory experiment with 360 participants was set up to mimic a 
typical household survey, with participants randomly allocated into one of 
36 clusters (`villages’) where prices differed between clusters because of 
transport costs. Participants made choices over 14 soft drinks (six energy 
drinks, five colas, three other soft drinks) whose baseline prices range from 
$2.80 per liter to $11.20 per liter (US$2 to US$8), where this quality variation 
reflects brand effects, package size effects, and product type effects. 
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In addition to the between-subject variation we also have within-subject 
variation from six counterfactual price distributions based on ad valorem 
and specific taxes of various rates, and also two types of price discounts. 
We gathered five rounds of data from participants, corresponding to five 
days of recording in a typical household survey, allowing for a stochastic 
distribution of daily prices and incomes.
We observe quality downgrading in expensive villages within our lab, in 
keeping with the patterns seen in the field data. In other words, buying lower 
quality drinks is one way to cope with higher prices. Counterfactual price 
rises also cause quality downgrading, while price cuts cause the average 
quality purchased to rise. If we aggregate across products to consider 
group-level price elasticities, the own-price elasticity of quantity demand 
for soft drinks is overstated by about 40% if the response of quality to 
price is ignored. The nature of our participants and of the drinks that were 
feasible to use in our economics laboratory make this likely to be a lower 
bound on the degree of bias.
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Session Topic: Bargaining (Room LH007)
•	 Olivier Bochet. ‘Experiments on multidimensional bargaining.’
Authors: Olivier Bochet, Manshu Khanna, Simon Siegenthaler
Abstract: Negotiations and bargaining are notions which are the heart of 
the functioning of modern market economies. In the economic literature, 
the standard case studied is one where parties bargain over the terms of 
trade of a single object. However, many real world negotiations do not 
necessarily fall under this simple benchmark case. Labor contracts, for 
instance, involve multiple attributes such as wage, (flexible) work hours, 
and other “perks.” Multidimensional negotiations offer a richer set-up than 
the case of a single object, because the number of qualitatively different 
information structures increases and it becomes possible to trade bundles 
of objects. We study an experimental environment where buyers and sellers 
negotiate over multiple items. Our treatments vary the negotiation setting 
and the level of information, providing a comprehensive account of bilateral 
trade outcomes in the lab when there are multiple objects.
•	 Ben Greiner. ‘The economics of colors: A null result.’
Authors: Ben Greiner, Marianne Stephanides
Abstract: Color research has a long tradition in psychology, consumer 
behavior, and marketing research. The literature suggests that exposure to 
colors influences mood and emotions of humans as well as their attitudes 
towards products. This paper makes two contributions. First, we review the 
existing literature in science and psychology on the effects of environmental 
colors (red and blue) on physiological functions, mood, and consumer/
economic decision-making, insofar it may be potentially relevant to 
experimental and behavioral economists. Second, we conduct a laboratory 
experiment with a typical experimental economics subject pool testing the 
predicted effects of environmental colors red and blue on decision-making 
in an incentivized Ultimatum Game experiment. We find no statistically 
significant effect. However, we also cannot replicate previous results of 
exposure to colors red and blue on mood as measured by established 
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questionnaire instruments. Our results suggest that experimental 
economists do not need to worry about the potential confound of colors in 
economic decision-making.
•	 Bassim Allaheebb. ‘The effect of effort in the ultimatum game:  
A cross-cultural analysis.’
Authors: Bassim Allaheeb, Luigi Mittone, Matteo Ploner
Abstract: The Ultimatum Game (UG) is a useful experimental tool for 
studying issues such as fairness and punishment. This study examines the 
impact of effort on subjects’ behavior in the UG. More precisely, it analyzes 
the impact of responders’ effort on the proportion of the endowment they 
are willing to accept from proposers. Three experiments were run in Italy, 
China, and Saudi Arabia. In each community, there were two experiments. In 
the first experiment, exerting effort by responders is done by making slider-
task on computers to reach a proportion they believe proposers would take 
into their consideration when they split the proportion. Responders must 
exert effort to be able to claim for a certain proportion without binding 
the proposers’ decision whom have the ability to offer any amount from 
zero to sixty percent. This experiment is controlled by another group where 
responders have an option to claim proportions without exerting effort. 
These two experiments are used to observe to what extent hierarchy or 
property rights have an impact on subjects’ behavior. We found that in 
Italy and China, property rights play a role, as in the first experiment, they 
significantly reject low offers more than without exerting effort. However, 
in Saudi Arabia, the experiment results were affected by hierarchy where 
subjects were influenced by both religion’s teachings as well as culture.
•	 Lina Lozano. ‘The impact of the menstrual cycle on bargaining behavior.’
Authors: Lina Lozano, Christina Rott and Arno Riedl
Abstract: This paper examines whether the menstrual cycle influences 
women’s bargaining behavior and outcomes. We propose that the 
menstrual cycle - and possibly the hormones progesterone and oestrogen 
- influence bargaining outcomes in two possible ways: First, via a direct 
impact; and second, via risk and social preferences as mediators. 168 female 
participants are asked to track their menstrual cycle for three months 
before the experiment to obtain a robust measurement of their cycle 
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length and phases. After the tracking period, they come to the laboratory 
experiment to play an unstructured bargaining game followed by a risk 
and social preference task. Our results confirm a variation in bargaining 
behavior during the menstrual cycle. Particularly, we observe that such 
differences in bargaining behavior are mostly correlated with the ovulation 
and pre-menstrual phases. That is, women bargain less aggressively during 
the pre-menstrual phase compared to all the other phases, and specially, 
compared to ovulation. Interestingly, this result goes in the same direction 
as the evidence for competitive behavior, which suggest that women are 
less competitive when the levels of progesterone are in their highest level. 
Moreover, a portion of these changes in bargaining behavior is partly, but 
not totally, explained by risk and social preferences. This result proposes 
that differences in negotiation behavior and outcomes might not only be 
driven by nurture as suggested, but maybe also by nature.
Session Topic: Relative Performance (Room 004)
•	 Gwen-Jiro Clochard. ‘Improved information or taste for ranking?  
Experimental evidence of the role of relative performance.’
Authors: Gwen-Jiro Clochard, Guillaume Hollard and Julia Wirtz
Abstract: Relative performance feedback has been proved a powerful 
tool to enhance performance. Subjects who receive information about 
their rank, in addition to their performance, improve more than those who 
receive information on their performance only. 
However, the exact channel through which feedback affects performance 
is still a matter of debate. Most theoretical accounts use an ad hoc 
specification of the utility function in which individuals are assumed to care 
about their relative position, even if their ranking is not publicly observable. 
We here propose to challenge the taste-based approach using a model 
based on information. We consider subjects who have standard preferences 
but face uncertainty about the true return of their technology. In this 
setting, feedback helps to remove uncertainty relative to technology and 
thus increases performance because of a better choice of technology. In a 
tournament setting, taste-based models predict low improvement of the 
lowest performers, while the informational approach predicts a substantial 
improvement all along the performance distribution.
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We bring our model to data using a field experiment consisting of a 
tournament based on four math tests taken by high school girls. We show 
that our models fits our data remarkably well for reasonable values of the 
parameters.
•	 Juliana Silva Goncalves. ‘Long-lasting effects of relative age at school.’
Authors: Lionel Page, Juliana Silva Goncalves, Dipa Sarkar
Abstract: We investigate the long lasting effects on behaviour of relative 
age at school. We conduct an online incentivised survey with a sample of 
1007 participants aged 24 to 60 years old, who were born at most two 
months before or after the school entry cut-off date in four Australian 
states. We find that participants who were among the oldest in the 
classroom throughout  their school years display higher self-confidence in 
the adult age compared to those who were among the youngest. They are 
also more willing to enter in some form of competition, declare taking more 
risk in a range of domains in their life and being more trusting of other 
people. These results offer important insights on the possible behavioural 
mechanisms underlying the differences in career outcomes between people 
who were relatively young and old at school. They are also relevant for the 
prospective design of policies to mitigate inequalities created by school 
entry cut-off dates.
•	 Mingye Ma. ‘Using relative marking scheme to motivate group effort 
provision: Field evidence from college students.’
Authors: Mingye Ma and Youzong Xu
Abstract: This paper proposes a novel relative marking method to promote 
effort provision in undergraduate group assignment. The critical concern of giving 
the same marks to all group members is free-riding. We propose an unequal 
group marking scheme in which students may get unequal marks depending 
on their self and peer evaluations. Prior to the start of the group project, the 
course convenor informs all students that they will be asked to privately rate 
their own and peers’ contributions by the end of the project. Students’ individual 
marks thus depend on the following two parameters: (1) the overall group mark 
(same for all group members), which is defined by the overall assignment quality 
and marked by the course convenor; (2) their individual contribution parameter, 
which is determined by self and peer evaluation.
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We conduct a field experiment with 800 students from a large undergraduate 
introductory economics class. First, students on average rate themselves 
6.5% higher than their peers. Second, academically stronger students get 
a higher rating from their group members and rate others lower. Third, the 
gender difference in self and peer rating is significant. Compared with males, 
female students give lower evaluations for both themselves and their peers. 
Both male and female students rate their female peers higher than their 
male peers. Finally, compared to previous years, We found a substantial 
decrease in the number of complaints about free-riding.
•	 Bettina Rockenbach. ‘Social context engineering in children.’
Authors: David Buttelmann, Robert Böhm, Bettina Rockenbach,  
Jarid Zimmermann
Abstract: Positive evaluations are important to succeed in social and 
economic life. The evaluation result often depends on the social context 
the evaluation is embedded in. By strategically shaping the social context, 
e.g., by choosing to compete against low rather than high performers, the 
chances of receiving a positive evaluation may be enhanced. While we 
know that adults manage to strategically shape their social context, little 
is known about when and how children develop this ability. We study this 
question experimentally in 180 children between 4 and 9 years of age. We 
show that children are able to strategically engineer their social context at 
about 6-7 years of age, and that inhibitory control and schooling play an 
important role in this development.
Session Topic: Public Policy (Room 005)
•	 Romain Ferrali. ‘Partners in crime? Corruption as a criminal network.’
Abstract: The integrity and efficiency of the bureaucracy are essential to 
the workings of any government, and bureaucratic corruption undermines 
both the legitimacy and capacity of the government. Indeed, corruption 
is among the primary challenges faced by governments throughout the 
developing world, and in much of the developed world as well. While much 
of the literature treats corruption as the product of individual miscreants, 
this paper introduces a model that recognizes the coalitional nature of 
corruption, which is based on networks of accomplices. The standard 
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prediction that organizationally isolated bureaucrats are most prone to 
corruption is emended--the model predicts that corruption will arise in 
isolated bureaucratic enclaves and, surprisingly, that the size of the enclaves 
will increase when confronted by more effective enforcement effort on 
the part of the government. The model suggests it would be sensible to 
redesign government agencies to puncture the isolation of enclaves.
•	 Chagai Weiss. ‘Can brief intergroup contact affect attitudes?  
A natural experiment in Israeli Medical Clinics’.
Abstract: In many societies, even when segregation or conflict are 
pronounced, brief intergroup contact in busses, markets, shops and 
hospitals is prevalent. Such contact is often theorized as a force influencing 
intergroup attitudes as well as voting behavior and violence. Despite 
the prevalence of such quotidian intergroup contact, and despite the 
prominent role of contact in multiple theoretical frameworks of ethnic 
politics, there is little evidence regarding its causal effects. Exploiting the 
random assignment of patients to doctors in medical clinics in Israel, and 
leveraging a treatment evaluation survey, I introduce a natural experiment 
suited to identify the causal effects of quotidian intergroup contact 
between Jewish (Palestinian) patients and Palestinian (Jewish) doctors. 
I further explore how doctors’ bedside manners, measured by aggregate 
ratings predating my experiment, moderate the effects of contact. Doing 
so, I seek to establish that the effects of contact, are conditional upon the 
“type” of out-group members with which subjects interact. 
•	 Matteo Ploner. ‘When the state doesn’t play dice:  
An experimental analysis of cunning fiscal policies and tax compliance.’
Authors: Luigi Mittone; Matteo Ploner; Eugenio Verrina
Abstract: We test of the effect of aggressive fiscal policies on tax 
compliance in the lab. Our experimental setup allows tax agents to break 
a deontological rule concerning the implementation of inspections on a 
group of tax payers. In one incentive condition, tax agents have a direct 
monetary benefit from higher compliance; in another, they have none. Tax 
payers, on the other hand, go through a phase of stringent inspections 
under their tax agents and one where inspection probabilities are fixed and 
implemented by a random device. We find that tax agents bend the rules 
to their advantage. Many either perform very frequent inspections or place 
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them in a strategic way, managing to enforce a norm of high compliance. 
Those following the rules have no success. Surprisingly, this is true for both 
incentive conditions. Tax payers exposed to these audit strategies display 
nearly full compliance and continue to do so also when tax agents are 
inactive. We conclude that cunning fiscal policies can effectively be used by 
tax authorities, if it is transparent that they lead to higher overall compliance. 
This establishes a virtuous norm that can have positive spillovers even in 
domains where the state has less coercive power.
Session Topic: Principal Agent Problems (Room 006)
•	 Michal Durinik. ‘Post Promotion Effort and Group Identity.’
Authors: Michal Durinik, Maros Servatka, Lyla Zhang
Abstract: Firms often choose between an internal and external candidate 
for a vacant position. Does group identity play a role in deciding between 
internal and external candidate? If so, is this role just a tie-breaking one, 
or is the impact of group identity more substantial? We find that Decision 
Makers follow their self-interest first and favor in-groups only as long as this 
is not costly to them. We proceed to expand our design to ask: If promoted, 
does the internal candidate work harder through reciprocity, or is it the 
external one through positive surprise? We look at post-promotion effort 
levels for successful in-group and out-group candidates. We also elicit 
candidates’ beliefs about the decision maker’s choice, and decision maker’s 
beliefs about effort levels. 
•	 Mirco Tonin. ‘Paying for what kind of performance?  
Performance pay and multitasking in mission-oriented jobs.’
Authors: Daniel Jones, Mirco Tonin, Michael Vlassopoulos
Abstract: How does pay-for-performance (P4P) impact productivity, 
multitasking, and the composition of workers in mission-oriented jobs? 
These are central issues in sectors like education or healthcare. We conduct 
a laboratory experiment, manipulating compensation and mission, to answer 
these questions. We find that P4P has positive effects on productivity 
on the incentivized dimension of effort and negative effects on the non-
incentivized dimension for workers in non-mission-oriented treatments. 
In mission-oriented treatments, P4P generates minimal change on either 
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dimension. Participants in the non-mission sector ‘ but not in the mission-
oriented treatments ‘ sort on ability, with lower ability workers opting out 
of the P4P scheme.
•	 Andrej Angelovski. ‘Bidding for Better Jobs:  
An Experimental Comparison of Intra- vs. Inter-firm Hiring.’
Authors: Andrej Angelovski, Jordi Brandts, Werner Gueth
Abstract: Job candidates compete via bidding for higher and better-
paid positions in two hierarchically structured firms where, even when 
hiring is firm restricted, one learns about outcomes in both firms.  After 
assigning the top positions to the highest bidders at the cost of the highest 
unsuccessful bids, two intermediate positions in each firm are filled by 
similar (incentive compatible) auction rules. When failing to obtain one of 
those positions, a basic income is collected without bidding costs. Four 
rounds of inter-firm bidding are followed by intra-firm bidding.  We study 
how pay differences within a firm’s hierarchy affect behavior, as well as how 
individual characteristics like gender, cognitive capability, personality traits 
etc. affect systematic overbidding and influence who ends up in which 
hierarchical position. 
•	 Sibilla Di Guida. ‘Testing the myth of fee-for-service and  
overprovision in health care.’
Authors: Sibilla Di Guida, Dorte Gyrd-Hansen, Anne Sophie Oxholm
Abstract: Paying on the basis of fee-for-service is often associated with 
a risk of overprovision. Policymakers are therefore increasingly looking 
to other payment schemes to ensure a more efficient delivery of health 
care. This study tests whether context plays a role for overprovision under 
fee-for-service. Using a laboratory experiment involving Danish medical 
students, we test the extent of overprovision under fee-for-service when 
the subjects face different fee sizes, patient types, and market conditions. 
We observe that decreasing the fee size does not decrease overprovision 
when resources are abundant, but it does affect provision when resources 
are constrained. We also observe that patients who are harmed by excess 
treatment are at little risk of overprovision. Finally, when subjects face 
resource constraints, but still have an incentive to overprovide high-
profit services, they hesitate to do so, implying that the presence of 
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opportunity costs in terms of reduced benefits to other patients protects 
against overprovision. Thus, this study provides evidence that the risk of 
overprovision under fee-for-service depends on fee sizes, patients’ health 
profiles, and market conditions.
Session Topic: Methodology (Room 009)
•	 Stephanie Thomas. ‘Using virtual environments to study health related 
decisions: early results using a new effort task.’
Authors: Stephanie Thomas, Feng Xie, Neil J. Buckley, David Cameron, 
Katherine Cuff, David Feeny, Jeremiah Hurley, Stuart Mestelman
Abstract: Objectives
This project investigates the viability of using virtual world environments for 
controlled laboratory investigations of health preferences and behaviours. 
We will observe whether participants exhibit a willingness to pay to avoid a 
reduction in their mobility in the virtual world. The key aim is to understand if 
a virtual world can provide sufficient context to prompt participants to make 
health related decisions and to learn more about the use of such environments.
Methods
•	 Health is multi-dimensional. In this study we implement a reduction in 
a single dimension of health - mobility. Human participants undertake a 
task in a virtual world environment (a computer game) for which they can 
earn cash and experience a limitation in their mobility. We impair mobility 
by reducing the speed that participants can walk, disrupting the ability to 
carry out the task and earn income. Participants engage in the task over 6 
`days’ (treatment periods) each of which lasts 4 minutes and use a standard 
gaming controller to interact with the environment. We compare the effect 
of different levels of impairment using a between participants design.
We also investigate choices over treatment options which fully restore 
health (with complete certainty). We allow participants to pay for instant 
care or to wait for free care. In both cases, costs are increasing in the amount 
of healthy time gained from medication. If participants are purely earnings 
maximizers there is an optimal time within each day to obtain medication. 
Taking the medication at the optimal time balances the costs and benefits 
of treatment and involves remaining in the ill state for a portion of time. 
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Participant preferences for better mobility in the virtual environment are 
thus reflected in the timing of their decisions to obtain this medication, with 
earlier treatment indicating a willingness to pay for medication in excess of 
the higher returns gained from in the unimpaired state.
Results
So far we have run two `pre-pilot’ studies in which we gathered feedback 
about our virtual world from participants and incorporated updates to the 
our programming. In those studies we observed that some participants 
chose to obtain treatment immediately and stated in post-study interviews 
that they did not care about the cost of treatment and found the impairment 
to be disruptive. In October 2018 we will implement our experiment again 
and compare responses between two groups of individuals, with each group 
defined by the degree of impairment they experience. The salience of our 
impairment will be revealed by the timing of treatment decisions. If those 
participants who experience greater impairment are less likely to choose the 
earnings maximizing treatment time then we can infer that the impairment 
has additional impacts, beyond lost earnings, and can potentially infer the 
willingness to pay to avoid time spent with impaired mobility.
This work forms a preliminary study of the effectiveness of virtual worlds 
for investigating health related decisions. We hope to be able to comment 
on the viability of such environments for behavioural and experimental 
health research, to share insights about the experience of developing such 
an environment, and to gain insightful feedback from participants at the 
workshop at a relatively early stage of research.
•	 Robert Schmidt. ‘Identifying the Distribution of Focal Points in 
Coordination Games on the Individual Level.’
Abstract: We propose a modified Keynesian beauty contest that allows 
eliciting the distribution of focal points in coordination games on the 
individual level. We modify the classical Keynesian beauty contest such that 
individuals have the possibility to allocate points to the available options. 
This enables subjects to invest in several of the available options and it 
allows weighing their choices, which in turn reveals the ranking of focal 
points. We theoretically derive predictions for coordination outcomes and 
show that subjects should reveal their personal ranking of how focal they 
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evaluate the different options, provided that two assumptions regarding 
risk attitude and belief structure are met. In an experiment on the elicitation 
of social norm perception, we compare the proposed mechanism with 
the approach by Krupka and Weber (2013), who use the classical beauty 
contest setting. Our data confirms the predictions and demonstrates that 
the proposed technique is suited to measure the distribution of focal points 
in coordination games on the individual level. Finally, using simulations, we 
find that the technique is more efficient in the sense that it converges faster 
to the underlying distribution of focal points and identifies the modal focal 
point with higher confidence for a given number of subjects.
•	 Theodore Turocy. ‘A demonstration and comparison of estimation 
methods for quantal response equilibria in games.’
Abstract: I demonstrate how to use the facilities in the Gambit software 
package to estimate parameters for logit quantal response equilibria 
(QRE). I compare two methods for estimation: one which solves the 
fixed-point problem for QRE, which is computationally time-consuming 
for large games, versus a recently-proposed alternative which uses a 
rational-expectations approach to avoid the fixed-point problem.  I show 
that the rational-expectations approach is biased, in that the estimates 
logit precision parameter lambda (in the terminology of McKelvey-Palfrey 
1995) are systematically too small, implying best-response behaviour is less 
precise than it actually is.
•	 Xu Yan. ‘Top-Flop Betting: An incentive mechanism to elicit unverifiable truths.’
Author: Aurelien Baillon
Abstract: This paper introduces a simple mechanism to incentivize 
truth-telling even when the underlying truth is unverifiable. Most similar 
mechanisms in the literature rely on the existence of a common prior about 
the distribution of possible answers and on Bayesian arguments. In our 
mechanism, respondents to a question bet on the answers of others, relative 
to the answers given to other questions. For instance, people are asked to 
bet whether they think a given movie will get higher ratings than another, 
random movie. The bet reveals whether people themselves liked the movie. 
We call this method ` `top-flop betting” and show that it provides incentives 
to truthfully reveal private information, even in the presence of biases in the 
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answers the bets are based on. Unlike existing methods, our method (i) 
relaxes assumptions on common prior; (ii) is robust to risk aversion and 
certainty effects, basically requiring first-order stochastic dominance only; 
(iii) leads to truth-telling as dominant in individual setting and a Bayesian 
equilibrium in game setting (not needing a Bayesian Nash equilibrium)
Session Topic: Bounded Rationality (Room 001A)
•	 Hanh Tong. ‘Individual Heterogeneity in Traveler’s Dilemma.’
Authors: David Freeman and Hanh Tong
Abstract: We study individual heterogeneity in decision rules and levels of 
strategic thinking, using Traveler’s Dilemma. In our within-subject design, 
subjects make choices in three blocks of ten of the Traveler’s Dilemma 
game without feedback. In line with previous studies, we find a statistical 
negative effect of the reward ‘ penalty on subject’s claims. Second, there 
are three spikes in the relative frequency of choices at exact upper bound, 
exact middle and exact lower bound, which account for around 50% of 
the total number of choices. Third, variations of Nash, Quantal Response 
Equilibrium, and Level-k do not fit the aggregate data well.  Fourth, we 
compare the performance of leading models from behavioural game theory 
at the individual level.
•	 Ada Kovaliukaite. ‘The Predictive Success of Theories of Strategic 
Thinking: A Non-parametric Evaluation.’
Authors: David Rojo Arjona, Daniel E. Fragiadakis and Ada Kovaliukaite
Abstract: Theories of non-equilibrium strategic thinking (e.g. Level-k and 
Cognitive Hierarchy) intend to describe how individuals actually behave. But 
how much of their descriptive accuracy is driven by being more permissive 
theories? We modify Selten [1991] axiomatic measure of predictive success 
to ensure individual consistency. By applying restrictions over observables 
to the individual data (echoing the revealed preference literature), we test 
the necessary and suffcient conditions of these theories and quantify the 
economic losses for deviations from the theory. The non-parametric results 
are favourable for these theories and show that their predictive success is 
not mechanically due to their permissiveness.
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•	 Daniel Schunk. ‘An Experimental Beauty-Contest Game with Children 
and Adults.’
Authors: Henning Hermes, Daniel Schunk
Abstract: We develop a new method to measure strategic interaction 
with children, using an adapted form of the experimental beauty-contest 
game (BCG). We test the design of the game in a study in schools with 114 
children aged 9’11 years. In addition, we collected measures on cognitive 
and empathy skills to identify determinants of successful performance in 
the game. Results demonstrate that children in this age group are indeed 
capable of strategic interaction. While cognitive skills, measured as fluid IQ, 
are not related to performance in the BCG, behavioral indicators of empathy 
skills are strong predictors for successful strategic interaction. We validate 
our findings using a standard student sample playing the new form of the 
experimental BCG and show that their results are in line with classical forms 
of the BCG. Our findings emphasize the importance of socio-emotional 
skills, namely empathy skills, for strategic interaction and, more generally, 
economic decision-making.
•	 Konrad Grabiszewski. ‘Tree construction and backward induction:  
a mobile experiment.’
Authors: Konrad Grabiszewski and Alex Horenstein
Abstract: Game theory is a collection of tools to analyze interactive 
situations. We focus on two fundamental tools employed in the context of 
dynamic games: tree construction (modeling reality in its simplified form) 
and backward induction (solving the tree in terms of strategy profiles). We 
ask whether these tools work; that is, whether people behave as if they 
were constructing trees and backward inducting. We find that sometimes 
these tools work and proceed to explain when and why they fail. We find 
two key forces: subject’s skills and complexity of interaction. We show how 
to measure skills and complexity. We also analyze the relationship between 
the structure of interaction and its complexity. Finally, we compare the 
relative importance of skills and complexity in terms of increasing the 
likelihood of subjects constructing a tree and backward inducting. In order 
to collect the data, we conduct a mobile experiment: we developed the 
mobile game Blues and Reds that is available for free for both iOS and 
Android devices.
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